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GENDER AND TRANSITION. A Politics of Philosophy (Chapter 4/6)

Posté par radaivekovicunblogfr le 24 novembre 2009

Apart fromt the separate presentation on this site of the unpublishd book A politics of philosophy,  the latter starts here from its second chapter. The site is under construction and the chapters too. The first chapter of A Politics of Philosophy will not appear here, as it has been shortened and transformed into a paper for the online journal Transeuropéennes,  www.transeuropeennes.eu, where it can be read. That paper is titled “A Politics of Philosophy since Modernity. Indian and Western philosophies”. 

©rada iveković 


In the following chapter, i shall start by describing (though in a loose way) transition, comparing post-colonial and post-socialist transition. Then i shall proceed by analyzing the intersection of nation and gender[2], important for my topic because i am talking of transition today, within globalization, the other end of which are fragmentations along “ethnic” national lines. I shall further investigate the importance of the threshold of 1989 and especially of its meaning for the making of Europe. Finally, and this is my main point, i shall expose my understanding of world cycles and their connection to different types of patriarchies. Thereafter, the different occurrences of negotiating gender relationships are the practical examples that should be given in order to illustrate my point. But these i have developed at length in my books on nation and gender, and i can only briefly mention them here. “Transition” is a word which has come back into usage after the dismantlement of the Berlin Wall, to denote what has usually been understood as post-communist transition. Before that, i believe the term was first used to denote Latin-American transitions from dictatorships to democracy. It is not a well defined term, and it usually comprises some amount of triumphalism of western capitalism-restoration. We had better speak of the European integration within the context of globalization, than only of post-communist transition which is indeed a limiting term for several reasons. It is limiting not only because the Wall fell on both sides and not merely one – (which is particularly visible 20 hears after), because the whole Cold War dichotomy East/West, Communism/Capitalism received a blow and because it is not as if Communism alone had failed: the system of the communicating vessels and equilibrium between the two camps broke down.  The term of transition is also limiting because the integration of Europe has its own larger framework which is “globalization” as a whole, both the one of Davos and the one of Porto Alegre in 2001, both the one precipitated by the end of the Cold War as well as that of the postcolonial condition. My work on post-colonialism in some countries, on the partition of the Indian sub-continent and on partitions compared, has convinced me that post-colonial transition resembles “post-communist” transition to some extent, or that what we have in some countries of the Balkans and in Eastern Europe, if not in all, looks more and more like the difficult recent development of the 3rd world. THE TWO TRANSITIONS 

Where and how do the two transitions compare?  They do so precisely after the Cold War which is not only a European phenomenon and demarcation (the Cold War was much more acute and not so “cold” in the third world). The end of the Cold War coincides in the form & also structurally with a new geopolitical, economic configuration of globalized neo-liberalism, which makes it difficult for developing countries of the 3rd world as much as for some of the former socialist countries to catch up (since that is what is now expected).
Europe is being constructed with that objective in view. The new resemblance of post-socialist transition is not with the first phase of post-colonialism, where nationalism was the agent of liberation and was legitimated after World War II, all through the sixties down to the same dividing line of more or less 1989 which was also decisive for
Europe. Post-socialism too involves nationalism, but of another kind than the postcolonial one, although the latter is often cited an example. Greater integration movements (
Europe) and globalization at one end produce more and more disintegration, ethnicization, identitarian fundamentalism etc. at the other end. This is where there is a striking similarity between, for example, inner processes in Guatemala today and tensions or war and violence within or among some ethnocracies we know in Eastern Europe. At the same time, the identitarian drives in the same Guatemala – which received a new impetus – were not really an issue during the previous 36 year of civil war, and have appeared since the reintegration of Guatemala into the international community. It is as if globalization brought about, in different parts of the world, differentiating nationalisms and ethnicization. Before this last phase of globalization which dictates a new ethnicized discourse and processes of socio-political communal fragmentation all over the world, conflicts in Guatemala and in Central and Latin America were expressed in terms of class, economic inequality, conflict about land etc. Not that the conflicts have in themselves all of a sudden become ethnic- World War II was after all also an “ethnic war” going by our new vocabulary, but that is not what it was called. But the frame mind and the terminology have changed with globalization. The Cold War period was a period of extreme state and military violence by the state and the army, and, in
Guatemala, really a civil war directed against the population as a whole. This is certainly not comparable to the history of socialist countries (though post-colonial history in de-colonized countries is), but the aftermaths are very much comparable – due to a new uniformization. The Cold War was also a strict division of two blocks. The new world configuration since the end of the Cold War now favours major planetary  integrations of capital,  accompanied by a fragmentation on the local, social and geopolitical levels.  Likewise in
India, anti-colonial liberation nationalism legitimized a secular nation-building project. With its erosion which is globally contemporary with the end of the Cold War and locally with the liberalization of the economy by the state, various ethnic, communal, religious and sometimes fundamentalist projects have emerged. They are of a similar topology as those created in Europe (including
Western Europe, where particularisms have not always been integrated through happy regional and trans-national adjustment). Most European countries too have some such examples, and Italy is remarkable for it[3].    Not all of these phenomena can be attributed to “post-communism” or follow from communism. Specific forms of post-communist nationalism exist, but they are generally functional to “capitalist restoration” and vary greatly, discouraging any stereotype and encouraging comparison. What is now called “communism” was not another planet, just a specific form of modernity, like “capitalism”, or the latter’s “other”. The two together were a system and one was function of the other. The complementarity is extended and goes on after the Cold War. We must not lose sight of a wider and dubious integration quite beyond Europe, namely, globalization. 

 The divide after World War II – comparing (A) and (B) runs somewhat as follows. (A) is here “East” Europe (in my example and experience, mainly Yugoslavia) and (B) represents post-colonial countries (in my example mainly India; the case of my other example, Guatemala, is different). 

> There is a 1st PHASE of slow transition or adjustments before 1989, where socialism (A) & post-colonialism (B) have corresponding features; the Cold War will end in partitions for some. There are distinct cases:  The case of real socialism (with significant differences between, say, USSR and
Yugoslavia. Surely, over the following period countries such as Poland, Czechoslovakia or
Hungary escaped the fate of the former, in terms of violence, much to their advantage). This period of consolidation of the Party-state ends in partition (Yugoslavia, USSR, and Czechoslovakia).
  Countries of the third world  like Guatemala, on the other hand, have enjoyed no liberation but a most brutal repression during the Cold War period (they were within the US sphere of interest), and a social segregation, if not partition.  The case of post-colonial countries (B): partition happens at the beginning of this first phase of independence and is covered by the official image of the anti-colonial revolution (there are correspondences to the socialist revolution in the way these two events are « foundational »); it is the first post-colonial period of the Nehruvian secularist project, the consolidation of the secular centralized state. In both cases, – socialism (A) and post-colonialism (B) in the 1st phase – we have to do with forms of modernity, but the first phase (« unconscious », but « happy », or happy because unconscious) – ends up among other things due to lack of real democratisation, as the 

> 2nd PHASE of the post-Cold War starting in 1989, where post-socialism and post-colonialism have corresponding features in further  fragmentation, nationalisms, religious fundamentalisms etc., and the oligarchies of both try to preserve/reshuffle themselves and to negotiate new hegemonies; in some cases, old elites become new elites under new labels, and grab much of the country’s wealth, all of it within a new world-wide globalisation process which now has at one end globalizing integrations, and at the other end  identitarian fragmentations (which are really two sides of the same). This is roughly 1989, a threshold never as sharp when it comes to post-colonialism as it was for socialism, but 1989 certainly is the beginning of neo-liberalisation in economic terms in many countries such as India, China, some countries in Latin America, and announces such big turning points as the deracialisation of political and administrative life in South Africa. a) As for post-socialism (A), here partition happens at the beginning of the second phase, which is also the de-legitimating of the socialist project, of the personal charisma of antifascist or post WW II leaders and of the governments in place; post-socialism (A) at first has ethnocracies, and “centre” or rightist groups in power; first period of the post-partition effects, violence, wars, consolidation of the ethnocracies. This period can’t really be compared to some “de-colonization” from socialism, though there have been attempts to do so. Among other things, because socialism subsidized underdeveloped regions[4]

b) Erosion of the secular nation-project, post-colonialism (B) is shaken by severe identitarian movements (nationalisms etc.) and/or has ethnocracies too. The erosion of the secular project here corresponds to the erosion of the socialist project there. The effects of the time-bomb of the multiple and scaled partition in
India multiply on the inner level, and continue on the regional-international one.
Further “ethnicization”. After this period, countries of the third world such as
Guatemala enter directly the “2nd phase”, i.e. a time of further ethnicization which is the dynamics of globalization. Claims for ethnic recognition are now fitted into a project of human rights and (liberal) democracy formally everywhere, but really emphatically so in areas of the third world and of the former eastern bloc. It is the former west who acts as the neutral advice givers in this to countries of the former eastern bloc and of the third world. Democracy enforcement by war is part of this picture. 
All these mechanisms in former east-European and third world countries can therefore profitably be compared: there is gradual convergence of the two, and the erasure of inner differences between them. 

Observing the countries of the former Yugoslavia as they are today[5], in a form which one knows to be transitory, cannot but leave one skeptical. No exaggerated euphoria seems today possible over ethnocracies, over countries where the “de-nazification” after the bloody wars of the nineties has not yet been achieved or is not even aimed at[6], or over some of those pseudo-statal entities. At the same time, like in the eastern bloc, of which Yugoslavia was not part, pragmatic pro-european policies have helped defuse the nationalistic drive to some extent. Considering that nations are by definition incomplete and unstable forms, non-identical to themselves in their search for their own identity, one must admit that it will take at least some decades for the area to geopolitically  take shape and to heal the wounds of the past protracted violence. This will probably happen through european integration and local NATO dreams, regardless of the fact that these create new borders. That settlement will take place as
Europe itself takes contour. But
Europe is built of the same material, over the same setup and in the same way as its periphery, with the only difference that the process is more violent at the margins. So, although there is no alternative to Europe and although it is an on-going process, no excessive euphoria over
Europe the way it is being constructed seems possible. As the Cambodian ship “East-Sea” with an evaporated Greek or Turkish crew and with 1000 Kurdish boat-people from Iraq on it, who embarked off the Asia Minor coast after paying exorbitant fares to their slave-drivers, was unexpectedly stranded at a southern French beach in February 2001, we saw the ugly face of present-day and tomorrow’s Europe: the episodes have multiplied over the years and generated a general blindfoldedness, but that particular event had spontaneously triggered compassion in the French population[7]. As has by now become routine all over the rich world now, the boat-people were held in an “extraterritorial zone” with the military in Fréjus, whereby the authorities considered that the refugees had not even reached French territory – to which they have no access through their confinement, and which is euphemistically called “rétention” and not “détention”. This “allows” the authorities not to apply the convention of “non-refoulement” of Geneva of 28-07-1951[8], and then, as a minister said, tomorrow “we shall apply the law”. Which means we shall send them back (the only question remaining – whereto?). The lesson could have been learned from the violent events in the Yugoslav area – but has it been? After all, the “never again” of the World War II the 50th year commemoration was being repeated at the very time when Europe was faced, passive,  with the new war in the Balkans (and as Sarajevo had been shelled for years, the Srebrenica massacres took place, and the bridge in Mostar was blown away). At each celebration we hear the “never again” mantra. It was repeated at the 2009 commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin wall, as if much tougher, higher, deadlier and more numerous walls had not in the meantime risen on all fronts between rich and poor countries. Despite that such walls are as old as humanity, it is also true that museification of values is an extreme form of depoliticization which blocks everything, but is very accommodating of conflictual “identities” which, indeed, fit into the boxes delineated by the walls. If we don’t cultivate resistance, democratic pluralism, opposition, citizen’s defiance and control of power, as well as an openness and hospitality to others at the heart of Europe, if we neglect the expression of the plural citizenship of all individuals, we may well be fomenting tomorrow’s conflicts, both inner and outer.
Europe could have been imagined differently too. 
GENDER & NATION:  What has become discernible since, through the various third-world and east European examples, but also from within the west entering on a new phase of globalization, – is how gender gets inscribed as a hierarchy into a nation in the making. And how it is by the way reconfigured. It works then as an “archetypal” legitimation of any other hierarchy and of any other injustice through the analogy of the consensually accepted subordination of women. It is namely over periods of crisis, of great transformation and of collapse of larger systems, such as we had at the end of the 20-th century, that new negotiations for freshly realigned hegemonies take place. The rapport between genders, re-arraying the still maintained (though slowly weakening, at least in the West) inferiority of women, underpins and determines discretely all other relations, before being in its turn symbolically naturalized through the so established domination[9]. The degrading image and status of women as mere “ambiental” bodies in advertisements and in particular on some TVs[10], images that forge visions and values for generations; the constant refoulement of women from politics and the exercise of active citizenship in countries that lecture others about treating women (see France), the withdrawal of women’s elementary human rights previously held by women (in some east European countries), all these are signs of adjustments between male élites, and the price to pay by new all-male crews to get access to power. Constantly in practice finding new ways of downgrading women while paradoxically also constantly programming new laws that should elate them, is a doublespeak and two-pronged policy that has the advantage of satisfying opposed male constituencies at the same time and thus legitimizing, through gender, governing élites that may have been in need of legitimizing. 

The gender/sexual difference, as the oldest known difference inscribed into language, manages to sexuate everything. It permeates symbolically with sexual values all other differences within the sphere of the historically consensual and, thus, also of the historical legitimating of hierarchies that thrive on building divides between differences, or on transforming differences into inequalities[11].  The global patriarchal consensus[12] (the first of all globalizations) regarding the subordination of all women to all men is interesting also because it is universally used for the justification of other subjugations too, through a mechanism of symbolic « analogy ». This instrumentalization of a state of affairs (i.e. of the domination of all women by men) through its depiction as natural, and thus its naturalization and essentialization, is itself historic. This history of the social relation of genders is easily forgotten and masked by naturalization, i.e. by the substitution of the social and historic by the biological. The « national difference », when it appears, sometime between the 15-th and the 19-th centuries (depending on the viewpoint and the author), appears in the terms of the gender difference, « justifying » hierarchies that are paradigmatized by the pretended natural “archetype” of the hierarchy of genders. Therefore it is not possible any more to relevantly analyze the national « issue » without an insight into the dimension of the sexualization of the political discourse and of the sexualizing of the concepts related to the complex of nation, nationalism, of the becoming of the nation-state, of the citizen etc.  It is here important briefly to recall the difference between community and society, in the restricted way we use these terms in the present work. The nation itself is first of all a community yet to be made into a society – and never quite accomplished as such. Mainly, it is a promise. In a community, the individual takes refuge within the group, which makes him/her feel secure at the cost of his/her individuality and possibly even of his/her individual citizenship. This “maternal” metaphor discloses evidently an unquestioned hierarchy, expressed as the hierarchy of the fraternity, of the community, or of a vertical hierarchy. The maternal body to which the gregarious individuals or the member of some intolerant group ( a “community”) surrenders (say, the violent fan of a football club, or the fanatical member of a party) is like the army, the unit, the organization, like a machine within which he is just a replaceable part like any other[13]. Each of those members identifies with and interiorizes the vertical principle and the “father-figure” (the Founding Fathers of the Nation, for example) in order to be able to communicate with the others over that higher office, and in order to belong to them. Such a symbiotically integrated group, as a figuration of the Whole, is directly fastened to the larger group (the nation, the ethnic group, the religion, the community, depending on circumstances) which, although an empty concept in itself, is in its turn an efficient machine for the production of the energy necessary for violence and conquest.

In extreme cases of nationalist homogenization, that concern both men and women formally and statistically, the identification of or with the « other » does not occur in the same way with men and with women. Women are caught in a double-bind situation regarding the nation – they are the other or one of its others; this is paradoxical, because they also belong to the nation: they both belong and not belong! Even in their adherence to a nationalist project, women will be held unreliable and subordinated. The « nation » (a community) is the woman, and « race » is the woman to, oddly enough again, and to the letter: the fantasized « cleanliness » (lineage) of the “nation” or the “race” is guaranteed only through the control of women, but women don’t belong to the nation (or to the race) in the same way men do. This is because they are not its entitled bearers or representatives, except in some chosen figures (and monuments such as the Nation or the Mother) that guarantee their silent adherence to the nation or the willy-nilly enforcement of the latter on them. The nation doesn’t trust its women, in the same way in which it doesn’t trust the masses. It can instrumentalize both women, and the masses (the people). Therefore women get the right to vote, they become citizens, some 200 years after men, the first and only truly recognized bearers of the nation. Women have been added to the nation later and very disturbingly, because their subordination guarantees it. Thus they both incarnate the nation and its decline.  The national hero is a man. A community is constituted round a father-figure (the founding father) functioning as a supreme instance/office to which all (the brothers) accept to be equally subordinated. It is the Founding Father of the Nation who is the real subject, the one giving himself a World, while the humans can be made subject(s) inasmuch as they manage to be involved in his pattern and to take refuge under his wing for the security conveyed by the Universal. What are thus rejected (with women) are mixture, movement, transformation as well as plurality, to give way to uniformity and to origin within and through the same. Nicole Loraux demonstrated it paradigmatically on the Athenian historic example of state building.  The ideal of the nation, a masculine idea (masculine in the sense of a false universal), is however cast as a feminine figure: the Nation, a monument to an idea[14].  “The woman” is here shown to be the incarnation of the Nation, or the Nation is “the woman” precisely because women do not belong to it directly, but only in a subsumed and derived manner. There is so at least one fundamental continuity between Socialism and the new nationalist ethnocracies installed through the past series of Balkan wars: it is the continuity of patriarchy reconfirmed, though renegotiated and reconfigured. Patriarchy, of course, does not concern only women and their status, it concerns all the applications and symbolizations of social hierarchies presided over by a paternal figure (whether the Father is “good” or “bad”): children, dependents, the elderly, the weak, the vulnerable etc. The principle itself is even much more widespread. The consensus, necessary for the continuity, has been reached. 

1989 AS A THRESHOLD  The year 1989 is usually the demarcation line of the end of socialism, and the date of embarkation for the post-socialist “transition” which was never clearly defined. The general loss of universal, or its corruption since 1989, seems to point to some search for a new totality through such attempts as the enlargement of Europe etc. Elsewhere, even the Taliban seem to confirm this. Their fuel is the political canalization of an enormous sexual frustration and segregation which is intelligently (and perversely) maintained and instrumentalized by a totalitarian anti-political movement. It is another aspect of the problem that the Taliban are not corrupt and represent “order”, of which the population is in great want considering the failure of the state. Their collective madness shows not only that the sexual difference is at the bottom of many a political problem, but also precisely that what is at stake is (western) modernity, of which « socialism » or « capitalism » are then only specific forms. Nationalism (whose origin in the French Revolution was certainly at the political left from which it has since disconnected itself) is itself but an attempt to reconstruct a universal after the collapse of the previous “totality” or “ultimate truth”  which turned out to be false – since it proposed as universal a mere particular interest. But this is always the case with a “successful” universal: when, on the other hand, it is not consensually accepted, it fails to be recognized as universal. 

After the big shattering of the world dichotomy, the nation was and remains an attempt to avoid social divisions through a higher ideological and imaginary office. It is a vertical and patriarchal principle which is supposed to provide cohesion beyond divisions, vested of a divine transcendent power (which replaces, and secularizes, the divine power of the Ancien régime). The nation is so revealed to be one of the great historical figures of transcendence. It claims a state when it doesn’t coincide with one, in order to get a juridical framework whose aim is the neutralization of differences. At the same time when this is being finally achieved for the « late-comers » that we euphemistically call « developing countries », within the framework of the globalization of the western pattern of modernity, the « capital-sans-frontières » becomes trans-national and indicates towards a new universal, in relationship to which the same will be « late » again. This is usually pacified multi-culturalism, referring to the recognition of differences… within the neo-liberal hierarchy. Transitions take place under such unequal conditions.  In all countries, the political space is in need of opening and reconstruction, and political subjects, citizens, need to appear, including those who have been silenced in the past. They may indeed not even appear as subjects or agents at all, considering that some classical political forms, and such figures and mechanisms as representation, have proven to be insufficient or historically exhausted. They may appear “between the boxes” or in the “lignes de fuites” (Deleuze/Guattari) within new configurations. Here is where a negotiation still takes place over who will have access, and under what conditions, to the public and the political space. This is what “transition” is all about – a period of renegotiating political relations and possibly of renegotiation the concepts of the political and of politics. We need to move away from the normativity of those concepts as well as of such as “democracy”, “human rights” etc. But a democratic political subject will only be reconstructed in a sharing and reciprocity of judgment practiced in common by every individual, avoiding the extremes both of individualism or of collectivism and of forced identities. Self-realization must now comprise sharing, as Romano Màdera would say[15]. On the other hand, it is clear that we need new epistemological instruments in order to grasp on-going changes. “It remains to be seen what happens during this transition of the present system towards another or other ones”, writes
Immanuel Wallerstein concerning the transformations of the “world-system” within globalization[16]. And, says he further, “usual ways of reading will not appear appropriate anymore.” 

Multi-culturalism is often represented as the miracle-solution to all ailments of fragmented eastern-European societies that are called pluri-ethnic, and particularly of the Yugoslav area countries. This is why it will be of no use, and it is methodologically wrong, to explain the conflict, any conflict, in the language and in  terms of its results, i.e. of ethnic divisions: those are the outcome of the conflict and cannot be used to explain its causes or process. Giving heed to “ethnic” divisions amounts also to creating them, and using them to prevent conflicts is for the least naive, if not worse[17]

The constant claim for differences in the rhetoric of the war-lords and in that of foreign peacemakers is only the sign of their rejection at their hands. Their appeal is ambiguous when it is imperative, because one and the same expression in language (“difference”) covers both possibilities of acceptance and of rejection. The language that stiffens difference pretends to be able to define everything, to exhaust the meaning and to legiferate on it. It pretends to possess truth and to prescribe the only significance.  So Europe auto-legitimizes itself through the universal and humanist image it takes in its narratives, getting justified and recognized in its turn through the others (as in a mirror) to whom she would serve as a model to imitate: eastern Europe has played this role, and so has the third world over a long time. We have new blueprints of “others” by now: Turkey, the “terrorists”, “islamists”[18] Promises that are not held: the anticipated enjoying of Europe by herself (Europe constituted but also, to be constituted) happens through violence. It follows in this the same pattern as liberalism which “imitates the distribution of rights[19]” while making a new political theory which replaces economy. Abstract and useless rights, such as this locus of investment of the imaginary that is the Nation – are opposed to the concrete place of enjoyment of the goods they anticipate without ever really leading to them. Socialism, as a promise of a future happiness remaining out of reach, belonged to the same order. And so did the Balkans, imitating Europe because it is the way of enjoying it (anticipation through an eternal postponement).
Europe is that big promise not held – and untenable – under the conditions of the reaffirmed dichotomy. Under such conditions, there may be truces but no peace. Stasis and delaying violence, looming civil war. These lying anticipations of untenable promises, like the one of the anticipated enjoyment of the Nation in and through war, level in advance the temporal dimension bearing diversity and differences, as much as they allow for violence to be justified. 

All hegemonic forms, whatever the dominant groups, include patriarchal supremacy[20] that doesn’t concern gender relationship only, but also age, classes, peoples etc. Above all, any hegemony within the conditions of a scarce legitimacy imperatively needs to tighten the mechanisms of its patriarchal hierarchy. “Sexual control” (the control of the gender relationship and also of sexuality) is the first and most efficient “police” power. To exist, it doesn’t need a state (it is older), being present in all types of community. “Sexual order” comes before the state which it anticipates in the sense that the latter will rely on it. So will all successive forms of power.  Universality doesn’t apply to the various subalterns or to women except in order to subordinate them, since universality is itself a hierarchy. “Modern democratic states were able, until recent times and in spite of the universalistic principle that founded them, to ‘particularize’ certain ‘national’ groups within the law itself, without seeing there any contradiction with their founding principle.”[21] The Universal remains a resort for some, and also a form of guardianship, of permanent tutorship for others. 

National and world economy, as well as the system of states, develop in more or less evident long periods or cycles without dismissing or shattering completely – except in order to reorganize it – patriarchy. Such cycles or time spans are differently described by different authors. The transformations of the gender relationship elude easily observation, mainly because they are a slow and a very long term process. In this manner, patriarchal hegemony remains the “normality” and is conceptualized as insurmountable. This is how sex/gender becomes a normative category whose aim lies beyond the gender relationship itself.  Patriarchy operates then at two main levels, first as an “internal” pattern and mold which is then reproduced through the maintenance of the identity principle[22] in any hierarchy, and in Order as such in general, being particularly favoured by the constitution of the nation. Its continuity over longer time spans reassures the stability of the state and institutions. Patriarchy reproduces and maintains the latter in reciprocity. The state, and all the more the nation-state, “is constructed as the depositary of the collective force of men through instituted bodies such as the police, the army, the navy”, writes M. Spensky[23]. The identity principle – basic for the construction of society and state – associates universality to itself, appropriating it for the identical. It is therefore necessary that the subordination of women be itself universal in order to play the role of the universal pattern to the extent that even the organization of the state follows it. This is why “the woman” is traditionally, in philosophy, the limit, the obstacle to masculine universality, “universality” under the mask of neutrality. For this purpose, the construction of the state and of the family are two ends of one and the same configuration[24], and the ego of the future individual and subject is molded by and for both, but first and foremost through and within the family. The family is, on the lower end, “representative” of the state. Within the state, women will be relegated to the private space of family and rendered symbolically invisible and without publicity, exactly the way it is requested concretely, by the order of pardah with some castes and classes in
India at the turn of the empire. There, according to a Muslim custom adopted by upper class Hindus too, women were hidden behind curtains and blinds, and within the women’s quarters. 

At a second and “outer” level, patriarchy serves as a general framework in the very long run, encompassing shorter cycles of the evolution and dynamics of states, as much in their economic as in their political organizational dimension. And if the observed cycles of the world order (economy, relationship between the states, creation of new states etc.) may usually expand over 25, 50 or 70 years, the long cycle concerning social relationships of gender may last for centuries and millennia, with (only) seemingly identical (and in reality often re-negotiated) features. It seems slower. Yet its extension over a long period doesn’t prove its eternity, perpetuity or immobility. On the contrary, within the (historic) organization of the world where men prevail over women and dominate them, that we call patriarchal, the relationships shift and change over time, but often preserve semblance. The system has the task to make coincide gender and age relations with other social relations (to start with work) in order to conform them to the type of hegemony that has to be reproduced, to the economy, the social, political organization, and with the world geometry (the relations between states). This is not a merely external and formal concordance. It is something that fits intrinsically because the relations between genders cross, intersect and get projected onto all others. It is capital for the coherence and for the safeguard and legitimacy of the system as a whole – social, economic, political; at the level of communities, of society, of the state and also between states. In these various transformations, the gender relation (as well as the control of sexuality) will be reconfigured at the service of the reigning hegemony, representing continuity. Patriarchy indeed is a great stabilizing continuity producer: dominant formations have the capacity to invest, embody and enact duration. Societies where patriarchy has not prevailed, or where patriarchal domination seems traditionally to be softer (in matrilineal societies for example, which are however also patriarchal) are generally only closed societies or communities surviving in isolation. They disappear at different speeds. Patriarchy is “contagious” and it propagates itself across class relations and as fast as these, as much as other types of inequality, as the constitution of states. It serves to support them. It is impossible to imagine a class society and a society of unequal nations that would be at the same time equalitarian sex and gender-wise. Gender relationships as they are, are most deeply rooted and pervasive precisely because they are at the service of other hegemonies. States are made and unmade, and alliances among them are done and undone on the basis of a patriarchal hegemony. The latter doesn’t require the state in order to organize itself or to remain valid, but it is constantly reformulated by the state and legitimated by it in reciprocity and also through a constant permeability of the “within” and the “without”.  At the same time, the system of states still needs, even today, in order to survive, a patriarchal arrangement in order to aim at the power-hegemony between the states themselves. (The world power game.) We are used to perceiving the societies, and also the communities within a state, and to see them as the outer framework of all possible politics. It is within the state, indeed, that a public, political, civic space is created, which is supposed to make the negotiations for democracy possible, and thus to allow also sex/gender relationships to play the game. But public space is limited by the state, whereas patriarchy is not. It is international or, better said, transnational and it concerns all social and political relations. Crossing the margins by certain groups within it isn’t enough to make the state give in on fundamental questions of gender, since it is the state that institutionalizes the order of inequalities. The states are themselves simply the largest institutions: they are constructs, specific organizations, instrumentalizations with other ends (namely power) of social fabric, including gender relations. Not only the state necessitates a patriarchal hegemony, but the power relationship (and the hegemony) between the states itself, not to speak of economy at all levels, need it. The various hegemonies of power, and in particular those emanating from the state, hide the sexual/gender one, because they lean on it and get legitimated by the global consensus regarding it. A consensus they contribute to maintain, and that they have therefore an interest in occulting. It is really one inseparable whole – the organization of the world, the system of states and the patriarchal social order are one and the same thing, only perceived at different levels.  An understanding between the world order (which is necessarily organized as a more or less stable hegemony) and the oldest hegemony of the patriarchal system is necessary and it is always looked for. It is given in advance and reorganized on all occasions. Transitions such as colonial, postcolonial, post-Cold War, post-socialist transition all rely on the reconstruction of a gender order. During periods of crisis, when it is put into question and when the patriarchal order is somewhat shattered, these tight relations of correspondence and of coincidence between an interior and an exterior (the social and the state orders, psychic and economic order, etc.) are meticulously reconstructed with, in view, the new parameters. The sex/gender relation underpins the stability or on the contrary entails the instability in all important spheres: in economic relations, in the distribution of work, in political space, in relations between the communities, in the relations of different groups with the state and among themselves, in organizing the public sphere, in the reception or rejection of migrants etc. The unpaid work and the condition of subalternity of women maintain the economy of the states as well as the world economy, and both would crumble to pieces in the form known to us if that relation were not to support them anymore[25]. A true epistemological revolution is needed in order for the backdrop of the world order to be seen, because of the historic prohibition pending regarding its visibility. This is obviously also a cultural problem.  The space of gender rapports, which extends to all human activities, is also the privileged field of a power exercise. What would be a balanced gender relationship, where one wouldn’t prevail over the other? It would be necessary, to start with, to be able to invent and to imagine it, something that is generally forbidden by the (prematurely) closed narrative concerning it. Sharing power would probably be necessary, but that is impossible in a perspective where power itself has become an aim, a condition for survival and a mode of life. What would be necessary, are another culture and politics, another economy, another eroticism, another symbolic system and another finality of power. A relaxation of individual sovereignty, to accompany the transformed functionalities of state sovereignty. There is a very long history of male sovereignty, particularly in the west, with no equivalent, in the same terms, in female sovereignty, which is much more cryptic, or in Asia. But in such an option then, power wouldn’t be self-centered in the sole preoccupation of its own reproduction, and would be open in a perspective and an effort of constant sharing and democratization. It would be a public service of sorts. Power would be necessary then for the identities not to be arrested and ultimately defined. It would be required also that the hegemonic relations con-forming a system at all the levels, may not rely by analogy on the “norm” of the treatment reserved for women. That would be the case in negotiating a hegemony that is not gender blind. It would be necessary, in such negotiations, to take into account the invisible causality between the gender relation and other historically constituted hierarchies. We should lose the habit of seeing patriarchy as a hierarchy concerning only the relationship between women and men. It is analogy and symbolic relations that are at work here. Nevertheless, correcting the inequality of the gender relations and of the patriarchal hegemony (among other “corrections” to be brought into the picture) suggests that the action be lead at all levels, from the private to the state, and also to the level of the transnational. The action at the national level seems nowadays quite insufficient. But the “international” level doesn’t seem quite sufficient either, because it reproduces the national pattern. We know that the UN and various NGOs operate at a trans-national scale, but we are also aware it is so because, confined to the scope of the nation, action is selective, non-democratic by principle and, moreover, limited by the state itself[26]. At the UN or international level, action is undertaken in accordance with state policies and thus will not question deeper configurations of gender that concern individuals, communities, societies, civil society, but which also eludes them. In terms of subjectivation and of political action, it is now clear that globalization has introduced forms and actions that do not fit the boxes or institutions of representational or official and state politics, of state borders, and that many things happen at infra- or supra-levels that are not captured by square approaches. New or old networks bypass or overflow institutions in the traditional sense, and new agencies that can’t be assigned, identified, structured and ordered make their way, some of them more congenial to migrants’, women’s, or other alternative ways. In the sphere of cognitive capitalism, the shared knowledge of networks based on individuals and even on their bodies as carriers of the knowledge and of required experience have transformed labour from its industrial-capitalist sense. Workforce now includes knowledge-and-human-bodies-carrying-it, supposes migrations, genderation (both gender and generations), and the way it is shared in networks and transmitted over age groups. Workforce now includes the way it is paradoxically part of capital too or required by it – required as a new form of agency which escapes the dialectics of the subject-object relationship, or that of sovereignty-subordination. 

We also have two contradictory movements. On the one hand, in Northern, rich countries, patriarchy reorganizes more flexible relations between genders (without however disappearing completely) and allows for a larger but very controlled margin of empowerment of women, inasmuch as the social context allows for it. This influences in its turn, though slowly, the symbolic order. But at the same time the tension gets higher, and patriarchy is reconfigured in a much more exacerbated and ever harder manner for women in Southern countries, and also in most countries of Eastern Europe. The first (Southern countries) are at the same time those whose population grows much faster. Meanwhile, a South within the North spreads, through immigration and pauperization, and the re-traditionalization and neo-communalisms follow. Communalist movements tend to restore traditional patriarchies, however “ethnic” and “differentialist” be their rhetoric: this is not a contradiction. This creates unstable relations such that the system needs to reconfigure itself in order not to collapse. It always begins reconstruction through a redefinition of the gender relationship, whatever the level of emancipation of women in the Northern/Western hemisphere, and also whatever the level of previously and locally acquired autonomy[27]: the condition of women had indeed improved mainly for the middle classes. So patriarchy is always a step ahead of the world system (the patriarchy is already somewhat shaken, for some social classes), but also a step backwards (the ever threatening possibility of a reversal). The change in the sex/gender relation can greatly contribute to the destabilization of a current hegemony, but this effect of a precipitation of the crisis (its aspect of “gender relationship”) is at the same time slowed down by the other global components, as indeed the just mentioned rapport North-South. A theoretically possible and unconsciously always feared revolt of women for the change of gender disparity is the best guarded, the best averted of all possible insurrections, and it is systemically prohibited. Yet the system fears in anticipation and prevents the “dangerosity” of the destabilization that might bring about a change in the gender relationship, and it reacts thereto in prospect always excessively while re-affirming patriarchy. This has been called the patriarchal “backlash”[28]. Far from coming as an aftermath, the “backlash” can really be seen as preventing and anticipating, if we keep in mind the here proposed reversal of causality: it is the patriarchal order that underpins and legitimizes other hierarchies. It will then be in its turn reinforced by them, but it is a capital component of the system of intertwined hegemonies.  Hegemony is always a negotiated type of distribution and configuration of power. It can be more or less (un)equalitarian. It can and must be bargained[29]. When well negotiated, it leads to power relations that are more or less satisfactory for the different groups involved over a certain period of time[30], though not for the same reason for all. It is not all satisfactory forever, because there always remain some who are excluded. This arrangement is sufficient to render it legitimate, of a legitimacy that lasts in stability as long as the balance of the represented interests is maintained, even in inequality. As soon as the equilibrium is lost and as soon as the distance between the sense of reality and the prematurely closed discourse is felt[31], the current hegemony will in its turn be delegitimized and eventually replaced. Evidently, new actors/agents may appear who had not been taken into account previously, at the instauration of the hegemony as it is, which will lead to new readjustments. Women (the inequality of genders) are a historic stake of the reigning hegemony, and even of several subsequent hegemonies, in the long run. But from objects and instruments of maintenance of power (of any type of power), they emerge in a significant manner also as autonomous subjects as well as allies to others, especially nowadays, even though the process is slow and difficult. There are disparities and incongruence which make it difficult to account for the gender divide within the traditional view of the constitution of a nation, within the framework of the world order and within that of state relationships, because of different levels of reading and because of different perspectives in the analysis. A micro- and a macro-observation of the same phenomenon may be mutually exclusive or incomprehensible. The world system, in its relation of constant evolution and fundamental instability between the states, is always installed also by a (de)localization and a (re)territorialization of power, which changes its epicentre with the replacement of great hegemonies. And we have seen globalization perform a considerable de-territorialization (trans-étatisation, trans-nationalization) of certain elements of power. To speak in this context of gender relations makes us shift the scale of reading. What is the link between the different conditions of genders and the relations between the states? We are surely used to perceive gender-relations only within the area of the private and of the intimate. But this is a trap. This reduction to the private is itself part of the hide-and-seek mechanism by which we are made unconscious of the connection in order to let the hierarchy function unobstructed. 

The power centres in world politics change and some peripheries are co-opted by the centres, or the relationship between centre and periphery becomes irrelevant. Many observers probably think that power of the range of the world is nowadays placed to a very high degree in only one centre, the United States the only remaining “super-power”, or soon in China, while there were two mirrored great powers during the Cold War, and while there may be more in the future[32]. But in this slow reconfiguration of the centre and of the peripheries, something seems wrong. Far from being concentrated and localized in some main spots, as the economic and political power may be, women as emerging actors and also as symbolic capital of men are omnipresent. They are omnipresent and dispersed, spread across, as much as the patriarchal symbolic underpins all types of real power-relations. The world system and the patriarchal order are forms of organizing power apparently incommensurable and incomparable. But only apparently so. We still have to understand and study their co-extension.   It will be necessary in social sciences, and this is a major methodological point, to connect them in their interrelationship, and also to interrogate our own terms of analysis. The terms of analysis, -  an arbitrary classification according to which the world is  fatally intertwined with the cleavage, in an unequal balance, of the interior/exterior, private-intimate/public, feminine/masculine etc., and according to which the relations on a big scale have nothing to do with those on a small scale, within society and in  the sphere of intimacy. Once again, it is the prematurely arrested discourse on the gender relations (and not the open potentiality of those relations), that makes appear this relation as fixed once for all, as if this discourse on gender were not itself part of the re-configuration of the (patriarchal) relations such as we know them. The fact that patriarchy prevailed historically is no proof that it is undebunkable, but its long cycle doesn’t help us to visualize its ending. We have always pretended that the fact of patriarchy was the proof of its transhistoric eternity. But it is possible to think its end. And with this objective in view, it is necessary both to invent the politics as well as to imagine conceptual coordinates. 

It is necessary to take those concordant hegemonies together, as a system that holds: the hegemony at work among the states is not independent from hegemonies at other levels or from those that inform them. They interact and support each other in transition. At the bottom there is, in all cases, the example of the domination of women by men as paradigmatic and “archetypal”. This belief is due to a consensus fundamental for the system, globalized since the beginnings of history and always re-iterated and readjusted. It is also necessary to see how a hegemony which is not to be localized in space (and which, although historic, is also difficult to localize in time), the patriarchal hegemony, informs, underpins and intersects with the planetary hegemony or hegemonies on the whole. To become aware of this seems now all the more urgent since it is evident that the world is again reconfigurating itself after 1989 and the fall of the “Berlin Wall”. This is a time of redefinitions. Such redefinitions are usually proposed by those who manage the new hegemony, and they are ready to cut and sacrifice any amount of benefits or rights of women for that purpose, cuts that they would not be able to pursue during the subsequent period of consolidation. The latter, on the other hand, is the period over which, though discouragingly slowly, women may be able to resist or to bring about some improvement. The moment of redefinition and crisis is the occasion to act at all levels, trans-national and trans-state as well as sub-national, while keeping in mind the mechanisms of preventive desublimation and defusing (désamorçage). It is also the moment of a great difficulty to resist because it is the middle of a crisis. For example, in the former
Yugoslavia, in the recent war torn decade of the nineties, it became visible that women’s rights and position were threatened at the same time as the war broke out. The war brought other priorities than women’s rights to the forefront, which were by the way advocated only by a few feminists, while almost everyone else turned to their ethnic and national priorities. World hegemony is established around mainly economic and political stakes as the most visible ones in any case. The discrimination is at the same time its instrument and its result. Can a threat to the patriarchal (not masculine) order shatter this system and if so, through which factors? It can, in so far as, precisely, the gender différend is not essentialized, in so far as it is de-naturalized (and not de-natured): there where it makes appear the political, and where it allows for the tension feminine/masculine to be understood as THE political par excellence. And also there where it plays the economic (always supported by the state), i.e. the hegemonic interests, since the work of all women puts all societies in a pre-condition favourable to the (re)configuration of their recognized and visible hegemonies. Shameful (un-confessable) hegemony so to say, in order to institute and authorize all other explicit hegemonies and to justify them. At the time when the replacement structures of a social and political order are being constructed at the level of the nation-states as well as at the international level, through the localization of power as well as through a delocalization (and virtualization) of economy, there is a chance as well as a risk for women in the re-structuring of the gender order. This occasion should be seized. 
But just as power gets localized, the absence of power too has its locations. In the reconfiguring of the new order, poor countries will be left behind once more, as much as the “superfluous”, “unexploitable” populations[33], while attempts will be made to include women in a specific way, as has always been the case so far: not really excluded, but included as subordinate and as material guarantees of the hegemonies. This is especially true mainly of women from poor countries (from the South) and of those from disadvantaged populations and from immigrants into Northern countries (but originating from Africa or Eastern Europe). What is being installed at the same time as the financial capital gets “trans-nationalized” through globalization, are the attempts to close borders to asylum-seekers from the South and the hardening of  policies and of police practices regarding immigration[34], regarding the regularization of “illegal” immigrants, refugees, stateless and homeless people. If this is maintained, up to 50% of the population of Northern countries could find themselves without social, civic and political rights soon[35]

The world configuration that we know and have lived through up so far after the end of the Cold War, while the post- 1989 is well under way, is the one where the nation and the nation-state that inhabits it were linked with a liberal process in economy and politics.  This has been going on ever since World War II and especially so since the first big wave of decolonization, in order to contain the demands for democratization coming up from all sides. The Welfare state which is the result thereof is limited, indeed, by the form (of) the state itself[36].  It therefore cannot, even if it wanted to, put into question the patriarchal order that underpins it and reaches beyond it at the same time. Solutions may have to come from elsewhere than merely the national and state framework. This is also why, as it is, patriarchy was not dismissed so far, because it represents a basic structure both of societies and of states. But the new political subjects arise there where injustices persist and also where there is a horizon of historically acquired liberties and promises. They may be in their turn groups with authoritarian hegemonic pretense, especially if they are constructed in the way of a community with exclusive genealogy and closed identities.  Or they can be simple collectivities of interest, more difficult to mobilize but less inclined to succumb to the identitatian tensions and thus to the claim of exclusive power. Their impact is slower than that of the “tribes” of post-modernity re-traditionalized, but it could well be, in the long run, a bearer of stability. One such group, which is not a community and cannot be ethnicized, are women. Migrants, disadvantaged populations, inhabitants of the Third world, apart and beyond their possible constitution in classes or in ethnic communities, too. There is in them a power of displacement and of transformation of the hegemonic configurations as a whole. It is a risk, and there is no guarantee of success. Because the new questions concerning the subjects, and about who the future agents will be, locate them elsewhere than only within intra-state space. They are at all levels, and are made of intersecting and mixed identities. The problem is to expose and articulate the relationship between the macro- and the micro-level. The day when maintaining the present patriarchal order will not be able to guarantee the reproduction of the hegemony of nations, of states, of economic powers, it will fall of itself. We must think that that day those hierarchies will find something else to prop themselves upon in their transformation and that is what we shall then have to be critical of. We see that today, and this is a considerable novelty, the equality of genders is largely recognized as desirable in vast ideological areas of the North, but also in significant areas of the
Third World as well as by important international and trans-national organizations. Yet this is not enough, because world patriarchy supports the world order. 
And if, inversely, we democratize the field of gender relations through the political, the cultural, we are sure to influence also the type of hegemony that is being constructed. And we can regret the fact that all universal (i.e. the one that manages to seize hegemony) is of a particular origin without any will for sharing and for democracy. It remains nevertheless that democracy, always only  to come, is an infinite process, that the places of all can be the object of arrangements and negotiations, that they are interdependent and that the arrogance and usurpation through hegemony – which sooner or later gets unveiled – can be repaired in a more or less long run. It is a chance for women (and their risk too). Patriarchy is certainly a revolting fact, but it is no more immutable or incorrigible than other injustices and inequalities. It is the form itself that the rectification takes. In its pale, the unequal gender relations can be modified, contributing thus to a democratization beyond the gender relation itself. It is no question of correcting a natural order, but a historic course. This is always possible, never guaranteed, and unfortunately never achieved in a definitive way. The argument of the symbolic order has been repeatedly raised against the possibility of redressing gender injustice. It is a strong argument because the power of the symbolic is incalculable. But is it absolute? It is to be doubted. It should not be forgotten that this argument itself acts as a powerful mechanism for preventing gender justice and equality, and that after all, even in the area of the symbolic, things do slowly go forward. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY    Etienne Balibar, Droit de cité. Culture et politique en démocratie, Editions de l’aube, La Tour d’Aigues 1997.   

Marie-Claire Caloz-Tschopp, Les sans-Etat dans la philosophie d’Hannah Arendt, Payot, Lausanne 2000

Marie-Claire Caloz-Tschopp (sous la dir. de), Hannah Arendt, Vol. 1:  Les humains superflus, le droit d’avoir des droits et la citoyenneté; Vol. 2: « La banalité du mal » comme mal politique, (receuil) L’Harmattan, Paris 1998 Payot, Lausanne 2000.  Susan Faludi, The Backlash, Anchor Books 1991. 

Colette Guillaumin, Sexe, Race et Pratique du pouvoir. L’idée de Nature, Côté-femmes, Paris 1992.  William Guéraiche, Les Femmes et la République. Essai sur la répartition du pouvoir de 1943 à 1979, Eds. de l’Atelier, Paris 1999. 

Nations and Nationalism, vol. 6, Part 4 October 2000, special issue on “Gender and Nationalism”, ed. by Deniz Kandiyoti.   Radomir Konstantinović, Filozofija palanke, NOLIT, Beograd 1981. (First publ. 1969.) 

Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, Verso, London 1985.  B. Luverà, iconfini dell’odio. Il nazionalismo etnico e la nuova destra europea, ER, Roma 1999; Il Dottor H. Haider e la nuova destra europea, Einaudi, Torino 2000. 

Romano Màdera,  L’alchimia ribelle. Per non rassegnarsi al dominio delle cose, Palomar, Bari 1997.  Paolo Rumiz, La secessione leggera. Dove nasce la rabbia del profondo Nord,  Editori Riuniti, Roma 1998. 

Martine Spensky (sous la dir. de), Universalisme, particularisme et citoyenneté dans les Iles Britanniques, L’Harmattan, Paris 2000.  Klaus Theweleit, Männerphantasien, 1977, 1978; English translation: Male Fantasies, Vol.2, trans. Erica Carter and Chris Turner, Minnesota University Press, Minneapolis 1978/1989. 

Alain Touraine, Comment sortir du libéralisme?, Fayard, Paris 1999.  Eleni Varikas, Penser le sexe et le genre, PUF, Paris 2006. Immanuel Wallerstein, After Liberalism, The New Press, New York 1995. 

[1] The present chapter has its sources and first versions in chapters of  my French books Le sexe de la nation, Léo Scheer, Paris 2003, and Dame-Nation. Nation et difference des sexes, Longo editore, Ravenna 2003.  [2] A note on the English-language expressions of « sex » and « gender ». They have been very useful to denote the difference between a historic process of social structuring and hierarchy with gender roles, stereotypes etc. (gender), and the biological difference (sex): this distinction, though existing (spol & rod, sexe & genre), is not always tenable in other languages to the extent it is appreciated in English for reasons Ii cannot go into within the present paper. In French, for example, « sexe » and « genre » cannot always be as neatly distinguished, which is due also to a different epistemological setup. The sex and gender distinction in English is of a pragmatic American thought-origin and disposition of categories, and it also presupposes a specific theoretical setting. Nobody can tell where sex ends and gender begins, nor is this important. That is also why the danger of « essentialization » should not be exaggerated, as it often is. See
Eleni Varikas, Penser le sexe et le genre, PUF, Paris 2006.

[3] see the concept of  “Alpine populism” of
Paolo Rumiz, or the work of Bruno Luverà and others. 
P. Rumiz, “Le populisme alpin”, in Transeuropéennes 18, 2000, p. 103-123; La secessione leggera. Dove nasce la rabbia del profondo Nord,  Editori Riuniti, Roma 1998.  B. Luverà, iconfini dell’odio. Il nazionalismo etnico e la nuova destra europea, ER, Roma 1999; Il Dottor H. Haider e la nuova destra europea, Einaudi, Torino 2000. Also: Michel Huysseune, “Masculinity and secessionism in Italy: an assessment” in: Nations and Nationalism, vol. 6, Part 4 October 2000, special issue on “Gender and Nationalism”, ed. by Deniz Kandiyoti, pp. 591-611.

[4] Ivan Iveković, “Yugoslavia, Fragmentation and Globalization:  Some Comparisons”, manuscript prepared for the  “World Forum for Alternatives” (WFA) as one of the basic texts for its Annual Report “The World Seen By Its People”(2001).

[5] Gabriella Fusi, “Il movimento studentesco in Jugoslavia”, in Primavera di Praga e dintorni. Alle origini del ‘89, a cura di Francesco Leoncini e Carla Tonini, Edizioni Cultura della Pace, San Domenico di Fiesole 2000. 

[6] but the de-nazification of Germany was possible among other things thanks to the post-war colonization by the Allies which, except for Kosovo and partly for Bosnia-Herzegovina was not done here.

[7] most of whom were not even going to be allowed to apply for asylum, while most others would be rejected – it was said so in order to calm a supposedly immigration-opposed electorate. In fact, public opinion proved to be more open than the rigid government position, so the government gave in after a few days and allowed 8 days (!) of freedom and access to French territory to all these refugees, so that all of them may, if they wished so, ask for asylum. Le Monde, 4-5 mars 2001, “Les Kurdes rescapés de l’‘East-Sea racontent leur épopée”, p. 8. 

[8] Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Article 33 – Prohibition of expulsion or return (“refoulement”), modified by the protocole of New York of 1967, concerning the status of refugees, a convention that France, among other countries, has signed.

[9] Examples of re-negotiation of the condition of women: the institution of the Rabin Ajau and of the “Señorita de la belleza de la zona militar” in Guatemala; the quarrel over reservations in India; the new feminist groups mushrooming since the advent of ethnocracies in the former Yugoslavia, the introduction of the “parity” system for candidates of elective posts in France, etc.

[10] See in particular Italy: Giovanna Zapperi, “Visions du sexe dans l’Italie de Berlusconi”,  La Revue internationale des livres & des idées, novembre décembre 2009, p. 14-16 (Editions Amsterdam, Paris). 

[11] Difference « in itself » is not marked, but it is historically and concretely construed as the hierarchy, domination, injustice, social inequality that are really « theoretically » based on it. « Long live the difference », « Vive la différence » is the slogan of both equitable social claims (possible, but not necessary), as well as of the (possible, but not necessary) racist arguments. As shown by Balibar, new racism is « differencialist ».

[12] Colette Guillaumin, Sexe, Race et Pratique du pouvoir. L’idée de Nature, Côté-femmes, Paris 1992. 

[13] Klaus Theweleit, Männerphantasien, 1977, 1978; English translation: Male Fantasies, Vol.2, trans. Erica Carter and Chris Turner,
University Press,
Minneapolis 1978/1989, pp 79-80.

[14] To the paralysis of the statue, Eva Peron is the only once living counter-example i can think of.

[15] Romano Màdera,  L’alchimia ribelle. Per non rassegnarsi al dominio delle cose, Palomar, Bari 1997. 

[16] I. Wallerstein,De Bandoung à Seattle. “C’était quoi, le tiers-monde?”, in Le Monde diplomatique, août 2000, pp. 18-19. [Here retranslated into English by me.]

[17] For ex. Charles Taylor, « Quiproquos et malentendus: le débat communautaires-libéraux », in Lieux et transformations de la philosophie, dir. par Jean Boreil et Jacques Poulain, PUV, Saint -Denis 1991, p. 171-202. 

[18] TERROR, TERRORISM, STATES & SOCIETIES. A Historical and Philosophical Perspective, ed. by S.K.
Das & R. Iveković, Calcutta Research Group,
Women Unlimited, New Delgi-Calcutta 2009.

[19] Jacques Poulain, at the conference  « Guérir de la guerre et juger la paix », Université de Paris-8, juin 1995, and other writings. 

[20] “patriarchal”, far from being ontologically or biologically masculine, is here but the fact that the masculine has historically prevailed as a symbolic system and as a power relationship. It therefore concerns everyone, and excludes those to whom it attributes nature or denies access to reason (or, more exactly, it includes them as subordinate). It is the principal configuration of any hierarchy. Women, for example, are included on the condition that they play the game and that they desolidarize themselves from other women: William Guéraiche, Les Femmes et
la République. Essai sur la répartition du pouvoir de 1943 à 1979
, Eds. de l’Atelier, Paris 1999. 

M. Spensky (ed. by), Universalisme, particularisme et citoyenneté dans les Iles Britanniques, L’Harmattan, Paris 2000, p. 13. 

[22] I call “identity principle” or “continuity of the identical” the inertia manifested by the same to reproduce itself as identical to itself in order to keep the dominating position. At the symbolic level, this is done through the normative transposition of the exclusive genealogy (the father’s surname). This becomes then an imperative directive line for the subject, especially from the moment when remaining in power has become a condition of survival. For this to be the case, some political circumstances are also required. But can we imagine a desire for power which is not (yet?) necessarily self-centered? A qualitative threshold has been passed when we have crossed over to that “site” where life means or equals power. This is where violence towards the others collapses into its opposite, in the long run into suicidal violence.

M. Spensky, op. cit., p. 147.

Eleni Varikas, “Naturalisation de la domination et pouvoir légitime dans la théorie politique classique”, in L’invention du naturel. Les sciences et la fabrication du masculin, 2000, pp 89-108.

[25] Colette Guillaumin, Sexe, Race et Pratique du pouvoir. L’idée de Nature, op. cit. 

[26] According to I. Wallerstein, whose insistence on cycles of the world system has inspired me here, it is also so because the medium term or the “middle run », which would be its time, « supposes an ongoing, well-functioning historical system » that can hardly  be put into question : After Liberalism, The New Press, New York 1995, p. 7.

[27] We have seen, in countries of Eastern Europe, considerably deteriorate the  material and legal condition of women, as well as their political rights since the general collapse of 1989, comparatively but also keeping in mind all proportions (because everybody’s, including men’s condition has suffered since).

[28] Susan Faludi, The Backlash.

Ernesto Laclau,
Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, Verso, London 1985.

[30] I. Wallerstein, After Liberalism, op. cit., p. 25: according to I. Wallerstein, hegemonic cycles in relationships between the states have lasted between 25 and 50 years in the past.

[31] Radomir Konstantinović, Filozofija palanke, NOLIT, Beograd 1981. (First publ. 1969.)

[32] I. Wallerstein says the opposite: the Cold War was a  uni-polar world disguising American hegemony (which was at its peak from 1945 – 1968/73), while we are heading today towards a bi-polarity which has yet to be decided between the USA, Japan and Europe (Japan will join one of the two others). The two great ensembles would then associate with (without incorporating them) China (USA/Japan) and Russia (
Op. cit.

Marie-Claire Caloz-Tschopp, Les sans-Etat dans la philosophie d’Hannah Arendt. Les humains superflus, le droit d’avoir des droits et la citoyenneté, Payot, Lausanne 2000. 

[34] at the same time as it is clear that this immigration will not be contained, among other things because of the need for more and more specialized labor from the Third world.

[35] I. Wallerstein proposes the number of 25-50%,  and says that “many (perhaps most) of these persons will not have voting rights”, in the chapter  « Peace, Stability and Legitimacy, 1990-2025/250″, in After Liberalism, op. cit., pp. 23, 34-35. See also M.C. Caloz-Tschopp (ed. by), Hannah Arendt, Vol, 1: Les sans-Etat et le « droits d’avoir des droits », et Vol. 2: « La banalité du mal » comme mal politique,  L’Harmattan, Paris 1998;
Etienne Balibar, Droit de cité. Culture et politique en démocratie, Editions de l’aube, La Tour d’Aigues 1997; –Nous, citoyens d’Europe? Les frontières, l’Etat, le peuple, La découverte 2001; Alain Touraine, Comment sortir du libéralisme?, Fayard, Paris 1999.

[36] I. Wallerstein, op. cit., p. 39.

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Exception as Space and Time: Borders and Partitions. A Politics of Philosophy (Chapter 3/6)

Posté par radaivekovicunblogfr le 11 novembre 2009

Apart fromt the separate presentation on this site of the unpublishd book A politics of philosophy,  the latter starts here from its second chapter. The site is under construction and the chapters too. The first chapter of A Politics of Philosophy will not appear here, as it has been shortened and transformed into a paper for the online journal Transeuropéennes,  www.transeuropeennes.eu, where it can be read. That paper is titled “A Politics of Philosophy since Modernity. Indian and Western philosophies”.   ©rada iveković 

A POLITICS OF PHILOSOPHY  Chapter 3  Exception as Space & Time : Borders and Partitions[1] In her book No Woman’s Land. Women from Pakistan, India and Bangladesh Write on the Partition of India,
Ritu Menon and her authors have confirmed that the Modern Nation has no place for women, and that citizenship was not really meant for them. Women’s place is uncertain both regarding the nation and regarding citizenship insofar as the two are linked. Various writers and scholars have shown that they do not include or include in at a lesser degree (as a constitutive exclusion, an inclusive subordinate way) colonised populations, different disadvantaged groups (“inner colonisation”), migrant and refugee populations. Or rather, that nation and citizenship apply to women, to the colonised, to the conquered and the variously “secondary” or downtrodden – in a subordinating way. Borders on the land or boundaries in the minds – partages de la raison – are lines drawn to produce difference, then to hierarchise it and finally to render it normative. In that sense, the view of  the “delay” of female citizenship  in time (some 150 years, in France, against “universal” i.e. male suffrage) or that of the “backwardness” of Third World countries compared with the West, which are as many attempts to set a boundary in time between the Modern and the pre-Modern, are themselves normative viewpoints. The concept of delay (time) and of distance (space) are conceived in a perspective of continuity. But the latter does not apply to the mentioned populations who disturb the prevailing continuity and consecutiveness. These concepts will now have to be revised if we want to move away from a Eurocentric perspective towards diverse sconfinamenti, transborderings. What may substantially correct the more traditional Eurocentric approach to borders and boundaries is “positioning oneself there where thinking is a vital necessity”. We might want to meditate on that: not rooting the “subject position” or rather the “process that the subject is” in the ego-position (individual or collective) confirmed and framed by dominant history, but rather building it on the side of vital necessity: there, where thinking is the last recourse for survival and for the existential (not only in the material sense), because there is nothing else. We also want to reflect on the building en creux of citizenship in a positive way, even there where it is not recognised, where it has already been outgrown, or where it is only a hope for the future. In situations of displacement, homelessness, partition, war, refuge, of fleeing populations or migrant movements. This involves a changing view of borders and of partitions, of nation and citizenship: these are no longer and necessarily only those rigid territorial, spatial lines, they are also temporal: borders appear and open up everywhere and in hitherto unexpected ways. On the other hand introducing the dimension of time as here permits to reflect on (dis)continuities and on transmission from generation to generation. Isn’t the laïcité (“secularism”) which, in France, was thought historically as the basis of the Republic, of the rule of law, and has been transmitted over a centralised system of public and free of charge schools, now in danger of becoming the exact opposite of its own secular ideal – when it yields to the generation conflict which dismantles the political dimension by the prevailing authoritarianism and conformism? The present chapter attempts reflecting on con-stitution/in-stitution as a way of establishing “ex-stitutions” (exceptions) too, those externalised “areas” or “times” that are without the scope of thinking and have been left unreflected, thus reproducing the normative rift of – reason and it’s opposite. We have seen plenty of those taking shape in the construction of
Europe lately, but elsewhere too. As Samaddar says, « this spatial-temporal resolution [through globalisation] of current history is based on attempts to iron out historically specific politics of war and peace with trans-historical explanations »
[2]. This ironing out of a temporal and historical dimension (in favour of a “historicizing” one) which confiscates the political dimension, characteristic of the palanka[3] also, of the post-colonial condition, is itself very violent[4]. We want to keep in mind both the conjunction and the displacement of the temporal and spatial aspects. One such big event of « ironing out » was for example the year 1989. For the inhabitants of the former Yugoslavia, it compressed time – they were supposed to step over, or rather to step « back » into capitalism («seen in a falsely restorative perspective as normality itself all of a suden, since the doublespeak of reason was forgotten). It produced not only greater violence, but also greater costs for Europe. The benchmark of 1989 was one such moment of suspense on a larger scale. It fashioned erased and conflicting memories[5], as much as other “critical events”[6] do, at least as much as World War II did[7], not to speak of the colonial heritage. 

Countries, Minds, worldviews, cultures can be split in different ways. We started working on geographical, territorial partitions, certainly because these were painful in many ways, as families are partitioned etc. We soon found out that partitions can happen along many other dividing lines; and indeed, some of us talked about “partitions of states and minds”[8]. They can  also operate over time, condensing time. There is an interesting book by the Spanish historian Santos Juliá, who says in an interview at its publication «The intellectuals have reflected in the XIX & XX centuries the permanent tension of the two
[9]. The last in line of the divisions of Spain had been the one over the Civil War, reflected in the silence for decades thereafter about its victims, the silence about the republican project and silence in a whole generation of people, our contemporaries, who grew up ignorant of it. The divisions in the past continue to produce new divisions in the present and in the future. The roots of the modern division of the two
Spains go back to the XIXth century however. The dichotomy regards the construction of the nation and the different ways in which the latter can be seen. It was always represented as a duality, says the author : true or false, new or old, official or real. Spain has always been and remained a fragmented nation. « The historic representation of the country has been shaped as a permanent duality, like two visions not only mutually exclusive, but antithetical. (…) This situation is prolonged from the XIXth century up to the Franco era which represents the exasperation of this conflict because the end of the Civil War is still felt as the elimination of an anti-Spain by the true
Spain. » He says further that the Catholics were foremost in the fabrication of the myth of
Spain and anti-Spain. The military dictatorship of 1923 in
Spain, supported by the Church, eliminated all liberal traditions. Since Francoism, any rebellion against dictatorship could only be expressed through the claim for democracy, but that was heavily repressed. The gradual but decisive return to democracy after the Franco era was however itself strongly embedded in the division of the two Spains and in the erasure of the republican memory and of any alternative history. But much earlier, quite before these Modern times, a profound partition had already been operated through colonial history, and the split ran, as we saw, over different lines and also between the two continents. One of them is the formidable rift established by the first modern constitution of Spain (Cádiz 1812) which introduced discontinuity and new sovereignties in Spain itself while disguising them into an acceptable continuity and departing from the past
[10]. Colonial spaces will soon thereafter remain extraterritorial and extra constitutional, thus discontinuous, but in this one attempt at least there was the paradoxical and impossible idea of including them on a quasi equal basis. That dichotomy lends itself as an argument, by the way, today to the Euskadi or Basque separatist claims. The wounds are deep, and they are more than one. The Spanish exemplary partage de la raison points back to the péché originel of the Cádiz dismantlement and replacement of the “Hispanic” monarchy by a global “Spanish” constitutional monarchy. The first Spanish constitution of Cádiz in 1812 indeed, initially imagined a tricontinental Spanish nation constituted of “nationalities”, resulting from a Cádiz Cortes with approximate “representatives” from as far away as the Philippines and the Americas claiming to come to some arrangement (mainly, commercial and economic) with the centre and in continuity with the centre. But the centre didn’t hold: subsumed political autonomies (among which, the Basque, the Catalan etc.) of domestic nationalities (pueblos) within the framework of Spain were not only accepted but were also considered co-constitutive and co-substantial of the Spanish nation, while overseas nationalities, whose colonial Creole elites claimed only relative home rule at first, did not get any political support for autonomy or independence. It was not a question of not giving it to the people – it was out of the question of giving it even to the Creole compradora elite. “European territories endowed with a peculiar constitution could be said to be independent” and to enjoy some status as exceptions (Portillo Valdés, op. cit.), but not transatlantic ones. Their exceptional status (ex-stitution) paradoxically institutionalised both them and their counterparts. Portillo Valdés calls this the “Atlantic revolutions”. Starting from that fatidic year of 1812, independences were declared, and “nations” established, without a people. This was the case in Spanish American colonies one after the other (and in the Americas at large), at the hands of the colonial Creole elites looking for free trade and the right to exploit for themselves, emancipated from the Spanish crown, the resources of the countries as well as the local population. Those nations were constituted on the condition of the exclusion of their people or of the indigenous population from citizenship, while modern European constitutionalism (for Spain, 1812) meant excluding overseas populations from one’s own colonial constitutions as well as from access to fair constitutions of their own. As B. Clavero will show in much of his writing and as
R. Samaddar shows for British colonies, constitutions were then imported into those countries again from Europe, barring the autochthonous population from the right to equal citizenship (the weight of this importation of ready made constitutions is still badly felt, politically, in the juridical systems of formerly colonised countries)
[11] and producing inner partitions in time and space. Latin American states will also do their best to import ready-made citizens or a “political people” from Europe throughout modernity, since none were identified locally. As both Clavero and José M. Portillo Valdés point out, this first – Atlantic – partition operated by
Spain has also its European flipside and is in tune with the earlier Enlightenment tradition of not recognising indigenous overseas populations any autonomous destiny or independence, not even within a liberal project (where colonies were only destined to satisfy European appetites). This colonial partition of the world is certainly spatial, but it clearly has its time effects the waves of which bounce onto northern shores today and may have some lasting effects. After all, those indigenous populations in many former colonies, and especially in older ones such as the Americas much after independence, are still not being included into the nation, or are only starting to be included into it with great juridical and political difficulties and resistance because of the initial fundamental preclusion or maybe rather forclusion: namely the nation there was constructed to exclude the population (or to include it as inferior), this “exclusion” being the very condition of its fusion, homogenisation and emancipation. What was freedom for the ones (coloniser at first, Creole elites thereafter) implied the loss of freedom for others (the indigenous people) who didn’t count. 
The division of the nation is by no means a Spanish privilege. Every nation is profoundly split and constructed on the exclusion of those who are not of the same birth. Such a founding rupture rubs off on citizenship too, since it is historically imparted preferably to nationals only. 

The political conflicts of opposed nationalisms in
Spain can probably partly be traced back to the emergence of the nation itself linked to doing away with the colonies, since that nation embraced all the others into its españolidad (rather than hispanidad) except indeed colonies. And it is exactly the embracing of the (European Hispanic) nacionalidades and their articulation as pueblos that offered this opportunity. In another European peninsula and later, the non-recognition of an all-Yugoslav nation within the former Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia by its founding fathers worked in a similar way – impeding congregating around a common project
[12]. The “exceptional” inner autonomies or independencies, tolerated for local populations (the Basques or Catalans for
Spain) in the form of “repúblicas provinciales” were actually inbuilt into the construction of the dominant nation and also of the state. Over the past decades, especially the Basque historic constitutional “exception” and autonomy gave rise also to local violent claims, considered terrorist by the state and libratory by the claimants. I am not trying to send them dos-à-dos. In the former Yugoslavia, comparable “exceptions” of “nationalities” were partly and unevenly inbuilt into the federal construction (calling for a “constitutional patriotism”), but they also later appeared as numerous local claims of various nationalistic factions in the recent series of wars of dismantlement. Several “autonomous” regions and minuscule autonomous “republics” emerged over the region, pretending to statehood and independence. What the latter example has shown, much as the historic example of India’s partition, is that separation is a never-ending self-birth process the possibility of which is inbuilt into the instituting and constituting process itself. And also, that it spreads its effects over time, like a time bomb. When the history of its doing is concentrated in time, we have acute violence and wars. Spread over times, its effects may become less visibly murderous, and its links to its constitutional origin may also become blurred. This blurring is responsible for loosing sight of some of the effects of the old colonial history on the shape of the contemporary world and in the making of
Europe. This is a postcolonial Europe, unaware of its postcolonial dimension. Europeans have been groomed to believe that colonialism is a matter of the past, completely ended. 
Along similar lines, the French will remember the concept of “Les Deux Frances”, which recalls the domestic history of the Republic, and especially the concept of laïcité, i.e. the split of
France into clericals and seculars, but also the split between Catholics and Protestants. Moreover that internal rift points out at and hides another one. What remains hidden behind this divide, is the colonial one: the fact that colonies were considered extraterritorial and of course extra-constitutional too. Today, as a debate is instrumentally launched by the government at the end of 2009 on the definition of French “national identity” in view of elections in 2010, it revolves again around the demarcation from others, from immigrants from the global South. 

A similar deduction of successive divisions could be enumerated for France as is mentioned by S. Julia’ for
Spain. It could also refer, at a more general level, to the divide Left/Right and to the great divide of the Cold War. It could even be consequently shown to boil down to the profound contemporary divisions in the northern hemisphere itself, and to appear in the making of Europe, in divisions between the USA and a certain Europe, within Europe itself or between pros- and cons- of the second war on Iraq and pros- and cons- of the war on Afghanistan. This is a split that the East-European newcomers to the
Union do not perceive at all – as they speak of their wishful “Euro-Atlantic integration”. That split runs down the whole of the West/North, itself divided. But it refers also back to where some of its major roots are, directly or indirectly (depending on the author
[13]) to the great colonial divide of the world, which was a colossal historic partition in itself from which many successive rifts start. The question can be asked as to how much of it is being built into the new
Europe today and how?
It is possible to say of any society, quite beyond the state, that it is divided over a variety of matters. In this sense, the state is a colonising institution. The state may deepen, try to defuse those divides, it may maintain them or feed them. It does not seem able any more, in spite of its restorative policies (Samaddar), to mend the social rifts, whereas society, civil society, to a great extent governed or limited by the same state, is not able to smooth them out and reproduces them, often while defending itself from the state. An innocuous French example linked to the social turmoil regarding the state’s research and education  policies (where scholars ask for more means whereas the state introduces cuts at all levels and tends to even formally separate teaching and research): «  Our country lives with the idea that there are two academic Frances, one that teaches, the other doing research. »[15]  

Not only are states subject to partitioning (from the nation to partition, from partition to the nation[16]), but societies also suffer profound divisions constantly reconfigured and negotiated.  It seems increasingly obvious that we cannot separate state partitions, social cleavages and partitions of the mind, or partage de la raison Political instituting in itself, as Nicole Loraux has shown so well on the paradigmatic ancient Athenian examples, already proceeds from and with minds partitioned, maybe within them. This partitioning of the minds is usually called by French philosophers “the political” (le politique). Nicole Loraux shows how, with the ancient Greeks and according to the city’s self-mythification, men were considered (by themselves) as always already “there” in Athens since and within the “origin”, but not women, who were introduced at some later point as really a disruptive element and an artefact difficult to fit in. As a necessary evil. So women are not “autochthonous” as men are, they are therefore unfit to be citizens. While instituting the city and constituting a political community, men construct themselves as the norm and build themselves into the dominant position which assumes the form of the universal. Women, slaves and metecs, but women expressedly, are attributed the role of the inassimilable exception confirming the rule. Here, it is the sex-and-gender divide that operates as the paradigm of partitioned minds and as the first form of the political.[17] It is also immediately highly racialised. 

We had started however from territorial partitions of countries felt by their inhabitants as historically, culturally or experientially one, and felt by them as irreparably wounded once partitioned. Today, we could introduce the new elements of the new migrations, on which
R. Samaddar has been working, and also Sandro Mezzadra, to show new rifts and partitions, new borders running both within and without, and we can see them in the construction of
Europe. European borders tend to be exported to successively new border and buffer countries (first Poland, then Ukraine; first Slovenia, then Croatia) in the sense of security; and they tend to become extra-territorial (Libya, Turkey etc.) thus projecting elsewhere divisions and creating new ones. They also open inner border-spaces. We must be reminded, as Balibar says, that borders are a European invention, and mainly colonial at that. The new globalised situation has indeed produced new borderlines inside
Europe itself, areas out of reach of its citizens, areas where the law does not apply, before the migrants and refugees even have a chance to ask for asylum. New poverty borders, and lines of division of the various new camps or indistinct airport areas where refugees are removed from our sight. Here, I would like to refer to Balibar (Europe as Borderland), Daho Djerbal, Mohamed Harbi, Benjamin Stora,
Ranabir Samaddar,
Marie-Claire Caloz-Tschopp, and Bartolomé Clavero, the latter for Latin America. 
Speaking about partitions and transitions implies a modern Western episteme which may be inadequate in the sense that it pretends to apply to other parts of the world according to Western epistemic criteria. It is self-understood for example that it is the Western type of Modernity that is being globalised, and that is not wrong in a self-critical Western perspective, or in another sense, in a critical post-colonial perspective too. This certainly depends on the way Modernity is defined, but overcoming the paradigm of the Western episteme alone asks for broadening the definitions of Modernity to other directions (points cardinaux) : not binding it by its origin but defining it also independently, in order to open it to the future.[18]  

The partage de la raison, or the partitions of the mind produces exclusions. Reason is,  namely,  normative. It makes itself into a norm when it excludes madness designating it as heterogeneous. Those that are then labelled with madness (or with the opposite of reason : passion, immaturity, primitivism, underdevelopment etc.) are the excluded. Declared unreasonable, they are deemed negligible or deserving elimination. It is here that
Europe’s universalising project historically produces the process of suppressing the non identical.
The Western concept of universality and reason (a certain historically marked universalism, because, needless to say, there are other universalisms too) has always been linked to Europe’s history and to the West,  and had been an instrument in colonial expansion, in various conquests as well, but also in the propagation of Western modernity in a broader and “civilising” way, which is achieved in globalisation. It has been the ally of hegemony and of domination. The enterprise of “civilising” has historically been associated which territorial expansion and domination of the West. 

In a recent article the philosopher Giacomo Marramao[20] compares reason and identity and enters discussion with philosophers that set, depending on the case, the one before the other. Was reason or was identity « first » ? He shows the futility of the question put in such a way, because none of the two solutions allows departing from the vicious circle. He speaks about it in his book Passaggio a Occidente. Filosofia e globalizzazione (2003). But the concept of “partage de la raison” has the advantage of cutting transversally through reason and identity, these two ill-assorted concepts that pose the question in a more complicated and less clear way. Reason already proceeds, inasmuch it is dynamic, to a concatenation of divisions. It is the moment of its freeze, of immobilisation, that creates “identities”. Without “identities”, there are no exclusions. The self-constituting gesture of excluding from « madness » from « reason »  jams the genealogies of reason (inseparable in its origin from madness) and allows to designate all that is rejected as exterior to the self. Some historical periods have been more readily prone to this projection onto the other of all the negativity accumulated in the self: diverse pariahs, witches, Jews, Blacks, indigenous populations, women etc. could thus be demonised as the unacceptable and infréquentable alterity that would individually or collectively become the scapegoats of the « good society  (i.e. of the dominant)[21]. We cannot really separate reason from madness, the one being constitutive of the other, both being reciprocally co-substantial of each other.  How much madness for one reason, and what is the price in oblivion of a memory ?  Each is but a selection, and all selection is « fatally » practiced from a position of force, also when the latter is diffused or is not assignable to a definite agency (Foucault).  So reason comes neither « before » nor « after » identity, but it always operates distinctions, bifurcations, divisions, partitions and oppositions which are its only way of moving ahead – and it also reelaborates and overcomes them when it is kept alive. When it remains “crooked” or “folded” and potentially ambiguous, that is when the straight line has not triumphed. Identity crystallises there where reason stops through laziness of the mind, arresting histories, narrations (constitutive of identities) prematurely closed (but any closure is always premature in the sense that it means death), forbidding alternative histories, other scripts, and political imagination; creating stereotypes, “identitarian” madness etc. The dynamics between the inertia of reason putting on the brakes (raison freinante) and its momentum, its movement (needing to be maintained open and fluid as much as possible) is inevitable. Therefore, we need to maintain the partage de la raison as its movement, but let’s not stop at reason definitively divided (partitioned) which distributes identities, because this distribution immediately establishes hierarchies, value, a hegemony, and through it a domination. Isn’t reason fundamentally normative ? We need to doubt of the  character always and in all things “conscious and individual-projectal” of rationality (il carattere « conscio e individualistico-progettuale » della razionalità, Marramao, “Ragione e identità”). Partition traverses reason as much as identity, and both; in the same way as it traverses everything, allowing for the production of difference. The production of differences is the condition of life. But discrimination – and violence – that is established and « justified » by it though not dictated by it – is lethal.  The agenda Samaddar writes about ( “Empire after…”, op. cit.) – of establishing/restoring states in order to keep peace, also influences, according to him, the form of the state as source of partition. Which the nation is…too. The state & the nation or identities” (ethnicity etc.) take turns and have a continuity in this. 

If[22] we add to this the fact that violence is the outcome of every act of self-founding of selfhood whether individually or collectively – what Baudrillard calls the « law of equivalence »[23] – and that this violence is a reaction to the « scandalous » truth that we are not self-generated (the fundamental suffering of the dominant subject)[24], the importance of lineage – of genealogy as a form of the split/sharing of reason – simply cannot be ignored: lineage sets sexual difference in the first rank of the differences entailing, via a process of calculated misapplication, inequalities in every field.  Itself a form of identification, this violence arises out of the principle of maintenance of the identical. To defuse it we must move towards de-identification, which blunts divided, inactive reason; we can then move towards split/sharing[25]. The felt need for a legitimacy, conceived as a supreme value, comes from the fact that the established legitimacy is not « natural,” that is to say the paternal function is indirect. In a matriarchal system – as Glissant points out, laconically emphasising this vital fact – « the legitimacy would have been ‘natural’ and so could not have been posited as a value »[26]. What interests him is how all this brings us to literature – literature always being the (officially excluded) other of reason, a founding fiction that enables us to advance. The discrepancy between the (conservative) linguistic system and the living language constitutes our opportunity[27].    The Socratic injunction[28] « know thyself », permanently rerouted or hijacked by the Christian West, according to Foucault in the sense of obedience and submission, actually rather invited for a « doing » originally ; doing something out of yourself, or making a work of art out of one’s life. Foucault after all wants to re-establish this both ethical and aesthetical dimension, or this aesthetical-existential aspect of ethics, without however evacuating the political[29]. What is at stake according to him is freeing oneself from the framework of attributed subjectivities. It is significant that European renaissance replaces god by the human (masculine) subject and makes the ego evolve in arts, while the development both of the portrait and of perspective in European visual arts, that follows it, accompanies the process of colonisation. A deep cleavage is at the same time instituted between the rational subject, agency, « man » ; – and his object, meaning irrational nature, the object of cognition and manipulation. « Woman » will  find herself by the side of the nature to be mastered. All of this is concomitant with the suffocation of affectivity, of the feminine within the self, with self-censorship and with the separation between and interior and an exterior, all of this both in painting and in the edification of morals and psychology. The masculine is confirmed as the opposite of nature and of those that are officially assigned to it (the “savages”, women, children) through a slice of the divine and of « knowledge », remarks Ashis Nandy, and it is so that sciences and technologies become in their turn the secular instruments of divine power[30]. This increasing masculinisation is contemporary with colonisation. It is not by chance that the process of a first modern and industrial individuation (for the male) is contemporary of the great territorial conquests, and that it is moreover expressed in painting through the development of the portrait. In philosophy, Descartes’ (1596-1650) cogito, parallelly, puts at the centre of reflection the self-observation of the subject, the already established ego. It is contemporary of  Rembrandt (1606-1669), the author of intimistic portraits and of individualistic self-portraits[31].  But the ego presupposes the partage of sexes (genders) and reproduces that of reason in constituting itself as subject. The enlargement of the limits of the known world was followed by the discovery of new freedoms, of the valorisation of the body (in favour of the witches, which are however persecuted at the same time), and of its opening up. Protestantism reacted to that through an inner closure and introducing into man a god with virile and hierarchical values, at the same time as the
New World was
discovered[32] as both churches joined into the territorial expansion. But Foucault signals that already  St. Augustin had introduced the inner line, the “consciousness”[33] part of religion announcing the same cleavage way before Renaissance, since the latter will only accentuate already existing features of European thought. While the Jews are driven out of Spain, and the Arabs are chased away more or less at the same time (the last ones maintain themselves in Granada up to 1492), Spain conquers the
New World.
Europe will go towards the others in the  mode of appropriation while it hunts other ones away from itself – and from themselves driving deep new forms of borders and boundaries. The bourgeois society and capitalistic relations both of the market and of the Nation-state will be constructed on that basis.
Europe produces its others both at the external level as well as on the internal level. As far as women are concerned, they are divided between these two levels. Many forms of resistance – though women may stand best at this – merely reproduce the binary relationship not allowing it to escape the violent conflict. 

Geographical conquests pretend to reconstruct a whole, reach out for « restoration » in our times or are executed under that guise (
R. Samaddar, “Empire…” op. cit.), while they also proceed through the amputation
of the inner other – which they themselves produce. This turning the clock back produces new cleavages expressed as ethnicisation but also expressed as a more conservative attitude all of a sudden to women, let alone to migrants etc. Divisions in giving different groups of the population different expectations regarding citizenship, produces profound cleavages not only between states, but within societies, and between different communities. It also contributes to new forms of communalism. This forced reconstruction opposes the partitioning that threatens the « identity principle » from all sides (including by women, dangerous classes, « wild » people, indigenous populations, « primitives », children, senior citizens, migrants, refugees, the non–documented and the poor). These exclusions are constructed, moreover, on a specific rational order not necessarily shared by all cultures, and especially not  necessarily shared by “savages”, the indigenous, the colonised – with whom it is often the conquerors that brought in, with a brutal Modernity, the dubious differentiation between working and playing
[34], between the private and the public, as well as a fractioned schizophrenic temporality together with enforced historicisation
[35]. The Socratic gnothi seauton, as shown by Foucault, culminated in the Western suicidal conversion to itself alone, suicidal because narcissistic[36]. 
It is also a detour towards oneself through the other by the means of an appropriation, and having oneself as the aim of one’s relation to the other. The same can be said of « protection » of those  « minors », minorities and the second-graded, of a « domination in their own interest »[37].  The subject must constantly produce antibodies (anti-corps) against this corrosion. The excessive utilisation of force by the conquistadores was fundamental: it is the excess of violence that operates appropriation, that renders legitimate and that recognises arrogance. The brutality, which alone can hitherto guarantee survival escalates[38].  It leaves to the victorious only the choice between death and – life thanks to violence, with no space for negotiation. Nietzsche  stressed well and with passion this threshold in philosophy, by showing the rapport existing between violence and self-violence of the subject in The Genealogy of Morals. It is his greatest merit to have understood that dichotomies limit thinking and prevent a breakthrough, even when through a counter-position, when the latter doesn’t interrogate the whole. It is with the « death of god »  and the sudden and irreparable responsabilisation of the human subject (agency), split over himself and become completely insecure, that the great division is manifested. Because the death of god that sets man on the stage as an epi-subject is at the same time a promised end of the latter through the scission introduced in him. The cæsure is certainly presented as, on one hand, rationality and, on the other, as religion or as interior/exterior, while reproducing the dichotomy. But that may not be the greatest of surprises. The surprise comes rather from the fact that reason from there on more than at any time before presents itself as partitioned and therefore as less reliable. There is then no possible recourse that isn’t itself an escalation, unless we accept the division of reason in order to operate a deconstruction of appropriative and self-founding thinking. At the same time, the “biological gets statalised[39]. This « statalisation » is a translation in territorial and geo-political terms of life processes involving time, a process of maturing, and it involves a certain freeze aimed at classifying, mastering, subduing and control. We see it for example in the way new border dispositions are introduced within Europe or on its behalf, which differentiate between grades or levels of citizenship[40] producing thereby both spatial and time divides; on an international level, the debate about the entry or not of Turkey into Europe is one such example. The way goods and capital are free to transit, while individuals and threatened populations are not, shows this paradox : it is now often rightist governments or officials (in France the former interior minister, and Chirac’s rival, Sarkozy) that can practically have a transnational view and largesse, while trade-unions and leftist parties are more entrenched on conservative nationalist positions wanting to prevent Turkey from entering Europe or foreign workers from immigrating, out of fear from competition. The historic movement of conquest and inferiorisation of continents, coming from the dominant position of (Western) man, was parallel to the efforts of cultivating the inner man[41] as well as to those of  « affining » the ideal bourgeois woman, constructed so as to express the subtlety of man, of the life-style, and in order to give a happy picture of a self-satisfied society while brutality reigns elsewhere. 

The elegance, the sophistication of woman, expression of the same cleavage,  is obtained (since the Renaissance lady) by her always greater sexual training (dressage) and by the prohibition, for her, much as for the indigenous populations in the colonies, of intelligence, of freedom and of citizenship tout court. Two parallel fragmenting “technologies” in the constitution of the subject are then available, at least since Renaissance (XVe et XVIe centuries). The one that takes into account the « external » dimension, and the one that will invest the « intimate » dimension “ :  the one constructing men, and the one constructing women, the latter parallel and concomitant with those constructing the Extra European Other.  Parallel to the conquering optimism at the end of the XIXth and at the beginning of the XXth centuries (until the end of the great economic crisis followed by WWI, then again by WWII, in any case), appears European nihilism : the collapse of certainties and values, the exhaustion of great systems, revolutionary insecurity, the dissolution of the subject, the discovery of the abyss of language as the landscape of its deficit, the loss of totality (and of the universal), the consolidation of a bourgeois class (and its intrinsic insecurity due to the working class, its other), the end of dynasties and empires. Super-man (le surhomme) and the underdog are their twin forms. God’s death and the subject’s crisis, the loss of certainties, of values, of aims and of foundations, announced since the collapse of foundations and the reconfiguring of sciences ever since the XIVth centuries and further by the construction of capitalism, followed by the mentioned evolution, have all prepared the way for Nietzsche. It is not by chance that his work presents itself in fragments. Nothing will assemble the bits and pieces any more. Life takes more and more its distance from human experience, to that extent that we can  feel it elsewhere of suffer from the lies of the present situation. This is already part of our daily experience in a constant manner. Radomir Konstantinović has well described this type of mechanism and has found the metaphor of the palanka  in order to express it in a general manner: it is the malaise of Modernity. This partition of Modernity cuts through the individual in every sense: woman separated from man, the subject (agency) separated from the citizen, the other appearing only as an object etc. hence, we are also ready for a meditation,  for ex-centration, for the dispossession of the self (more or less enforced), for the separation(s) of consciousness. 

From now on, when there is no, or when there is less ”exterior”, when the barriers of the Cold War have collapsed and when we cannot project our evil onto the other… what will be of the figures of the pariah ?  Can we reach out to the others on another mode than that of appropriation ? If and when we can, we overcome borders and partitions as an obstacle, and we prevail over the freezing construction of lethal and constituted exceptions, while letting us however be in the constituting mode, through the exceptional and different as a constant de

fiance. We need to reintegrate the exception.

[1] For a first version  of what follows, see R.Iveković, “Riflessione su confini e partitions in quanto eccezioni / Some Thoughts on Borders and Partitions as Exception” presented at the conference Confini / Grenzen organized by SISSCO in Bolzano-Bozen, on September  23–25, 2004, www.sissco.it in Confini. Costruzioni, attraversamenti, rappresentazioni, ed. by Silvia Selvatici, SISSCO, Rubbettino, Soveria Manelli (Bolzano) 2005, pp. 219-233; the present updated version was presented at the conference Conflicts, Law, and Constitutionalism” organized by
Ranabir Samaddar and
Gilles Tarabout at the Maison des sciences de l’homme in Paris on February 16-18, 2005. 
Ranabir Samaddar : “Empire after Globalisation : Some Comments”, in Economic and Political Weekly, November 6, 2004. 

[3] The concept by the philosopher Radomir Konstantinović, in Filosofija palanke, Nolit, Belgrade 1981, denoting a state of mind as a void, a possible turning point, capable of all violence, but also open to choice: a situation common to different crisis of Modernity. I have written about this in my book Autopsia dei Balcani. Saggio di psico-politica, Raffaello Cortina, Milan 1999. 

[4] Rada Iveković, ARTICLES:  - « Nations et raisons », Confluences. Méditerranée » 6, Printemps 1993, pp. (97-109). – « Nationalism and Trans-National Identity. From Auschwitz to Sarajevo »,  Erewhon 1, 1994 (Amsterdam), pp. 42-53 ; – « L’autisme communautaire », Transeuropéennes, 9, 1997, pp. 65-71. – « L’espace public et
la transition. Vers quoi? »,
La Mazarine N°. 0, mai 1997, pp. G, 7-18. - »Exil et mondialisation », Transeuropéennes 12/13, 1998, pp. 63-68 ; - »Identitet, zajednica i nasilje », Treća 1, Vol.1, 1998 (Zagreb), pp. 21-29 ; - »La violenza della partizione », aut-aut 293-294, settembre-dicembre 1999 (Milan), pp. 68-78 ; - »Nazione e identità nella transizione postsocialista », Pluriverso 2/99 (Milan), pp. 33-44 ; - »Penser après 1989 avec quelques livres », Transeuropéennes 17, 2000, p. 152-162 ; BOOKS :  La balcanizzazione della ragione, Rome : Manifestolibri, 1995;  Autopsia dei Balcani.
Saggio di psico-politica
, op. cit. ; S. Bianchini,
S. Chaturvedi, R. Iveković,
R. Samaddar, Partitions. Reshaping States and Minds, Routledge 2005. 

[5] R. Iveković, “Erased Memories”, in: Counter-Hegmony 3, 2000, pp.61-68. 

Veena Das, Critical Events: an Antrhopological Perspective on Contemporary India, OUP
India 1996.

[7] Leonardo Paggi (ed. by), Storia e memoria di un massacro ordinario, manifestolibri, Roma 1996.

[8] Bianchini, Chaturvedi, Iveković, Samaddar, op. cit. 

[9] Entrevista por Miguel Angel Villena, « Los intelectuales han reflejado en los siglos XIX y XX la tensión permanente de las dos Españas », El Pais, « Babelia » 20-11-2004, p. 2-3. The review  at p. 9 of the same is by José Alvarez Junco, “Historias des las dos Españas, Santos Juliá,” Taurus.
Madrid, 2004». 

[10] See José M. Portillo Valdés, “how can a modern history of the basque country make sense? On Nation, Identity, and Territories in the Making of Spain”, manuscript; Bartolomé Clavero, “Nacionalismos en
la Unión Europea. Un aporte reflexivo en torno al hecho nacionalista y a cómo abordarlo en pleno siglo XXI”, in El Diario Vasco de Donostia-San Sebastián, 24-04-2004; “Entre desahuicio de fuero y quiebra de estatuto: Euskadi según el doble plan de Lendakari”, in Revista de estudios políticos, abril-mayo 2003.
[11]  B. Clavero, freedom’s law and oeconomical status: the euroamerican constitutional moment in the 18th century (a presentation to the european university institute)”, seminar in the Department of History and Civilisation of the European University Institute, Fiesole, Toscana, Italy, European Union, 28 February 2002. See also:
Ranabir Samaddar, “Dreams of the Colonised”, manuscript; by the same author: “The Last Hurrah that Continues”, in Transeuropéennes 19/20, 2001, pp. 31-49; “The Destiny of a Translated Constitutional Culture”, in Transeuropéennes 22, 2002, pp. 75-87;  “Utopia and Politics in Muslim Bengal”, in Transeuropéennes 23, 2003, pp. 193-219. 

[12] See the difference between the Indian and the Yugoslav construction : no Yugoslav nation was supposed to emerge, and thus no Yugoslav nation was encouraged by the authorities, while linguistic and other comparable regional differences in
India were all, more wisely, subsumed and inbuilt into the nation. R. Iveković, “From the Nation to Partition, Through Partition to the Nation”, in Transeuropéennes 19/20, 2000-01, pp. 201-225.

[13] Cf. Samaddar : “Empire after Globalisation”, cit.

Etienne Balibar, Droit de cité. Culture et politique en démocratie, Eds. l’aube, La Tour d’Aigues 1998;  Nous, citoyens d’Europe? Les frontières, l’Etat, le peuple, La découverte, Paris 2001; L’Europe, l’Amérique,
la guerre. Réflexions sur la médiation européenne,
La découverte, Paris 2003 ; J. M. Portillo Valdés, op. cit.; B. Clavero, Genocidio y justicia.
La Destrucción de las Indias, ayer y hoy, Marcial Pons Historia, Madrid 2002; R. Iveković, The Split of Reason and the Postcolonial Backlash”, forthcoming. 

[15] Words of Michel Laurent in an interview « Recherche : la mise en garde des présidents d’université », in Le Monde, December 17, 2004, p.12. 

[16] My papers R. Iveković, “From the Nation to Partition, Through Partition to the Nation”, in Transeuropéennes 19/20, 2000-01, pp. 201-225;  De la nation à la partition, par la partition à la nation, Europe and the Balkans International Network, Bologne & Longo Editore, Ravenna 2001, “Occasional Papers” n. 18. 

[17] Loraux, Nicole, Les enfants d’Athena. Idées athéniennes sur la citoyenneté et la division des sexes [Edition augmentée d’une postface, La Découverte 1990; Seuil 1990 pour la postface; 1ère éd. Maspero 1981] (Paris: Seuil, 1990²);  La Cité divisée. L’oubli dans la mémoire d’Athènes (Paris: Payot & Rivages 1997).  [18] My papers - »Dynamisme ou staticité dans la pensée indienne », Les Cahiers de philosophie 14, mai 1992; - »Voir/entendre », Les Cahiers du GRIF 46, printemps 1992, pp. 89-97; -„The Individual and the Collective vs. (Post-)Modernity and ‘Tradition’” in Kuckuck. Notizen zur Alltagskultur, N° 2, 2002,  Freiheit, pp. 8-11; -„Rodnost same subjektivacije“ in Dijalog N° 1-2, 2002, pp. 84-98; - »Horizons de l’entre-deux. Temps et (dis)continuité’, Détours d’écriture 17, « Nomades », pp. 247-258, N. Blandin 1992. 

[19] E. Varikas, «Le “paria” ou la difficile reconnaissance de la pluralité humaine», in Revue des deux mondes, novembre-décembre 1999, p. 353. 

[20] “Ragione e identità”, manuscript.

[21]  Hans Mayer, Outsiders. A Study in Life and Letters, The MIT Press,
Cambridge, Ma. 1982
Esther Cohen, Le Corps du diable.
Philosophes et sorcières à la renaissance, Lignes/Léo Scheer, Paris 2004; Tumultes N° 21/22, « Le Paria : une figure de la modernité », novembre 2003, Tumultes N° 23, « Adorno.
Critique de
la domination. Une lecture féministe »,
 novembre 2004. 

[22]  The following section comes from my paper “On Whether to Acknowledge the Split/Sharing of Reason” in Transeuropéennes N° 23, 2003, pp. 259-278.

[23] Jean Baudrillard, « La violence de la mondialisation », in Le Monde diplomatique, novembre 2002, p. 18. 

[24]  R. Iveković & J. Mostov (eds.), From Gender to Nation, Zubaan 2003.

[25] Zalkind Hourwitz, Apologie des Juifs (1789), Introduction de Michael Löwy et
Eleni Varikas, Syllepse, Paris, 2002. 

[26] Edouard Glissant, Poétique de la Relation, Gallimard, 1990. 

[27] Arild Utaker, La philosophie du langage. Une archéologie saussurienne, PUF, Paris, 2002,  pp. 139. 

[28] The following section comes from my book Dame Nation. Nation et différence des sexes, Longo Editore, Ravenna 2003, p. 19 ff, “LE PRINCIPE D’IDENTITE ET D’AUTOGENERATION. LES IDENTITES”.

 [29] Concretely, Foucault situates it in different social movements he witnesses and is interested in. 

[30] A. Nandy,  Traditions, Tyranny and Utopias. Essays on the Politics of Awareness,
Delhi, OUP 1987, p. 81. Gyan Prakash, Another Reason. Science and the Imagination of Moden India, 
University Press, 1999. 
 [31] Perspective and the portrait reach their maturity in
at Renaissance and translate the arrival of a Modernity both bourgeois and urban, and soon industrial. This is not denying the beginnings of perspective, to say nothing of its stammerings at
Pompeii, and later in Giotto who preceded Dürer and Brunelleschi. Also, the XIVth century sees the beginning of portrait in Italy, in the region of Bohemia and in France, to say nothing of its old antecedents in ancient Egypt, Greece or in
Rome, and later in court portraits. But in painting, Rembrandt as well as Dürer precede and represent together the equivalent of what Descartes is in philosophy. 

     [32] In the proliferation of evangelical churches today in the
Third World, women frequently collaborate to the introduction of a new rigid structure of society and of a neo-communalisation. These churches can also organise ethnicisation. It apparently brings to womenfolk some order in oppression « which is there anyhow » in that it protects them from the male arbitrary « individual » will, the enemy of each woman. The evangelical churches forbid drinking, it is therefore welcome (the neo-zapatistas as well as the Maoist guerrillas in
Nepal do the same). That evangelical churches have also fomented counter-insurgent violence is not the least  of the contradictions of
Guatemala and many other countries. 

     [33] M. Foucault, Dits et Ecrits 1954-1988, t. IV, and the whole chapter “Sexualité et solitude”. I thank Arild Utaker for signalling it to me. See also J.-F. Lyotard, La Confession d’Augustin, Paris, Galilée 1998. 

[34] Ashis Nandy, “Towards a Third World Utopia”, in Traditions, Tyranny and Utopias, p. 42. 

[35]  By “historicisation” I mean the historicism of a “historicising history” privileging an oriented “progressive” history line and distributing labels of  “modern” and “premodern” or “traditional”, the latter meaning “underdeveloped”. The idea is of only one possible historic scenario.

Fabio Ciaramelli, La distruzione
del desiderio.
Il narcissismo nell’ epoca del consumo di massa, Bari, Dedalo 2000. 

M. Spensky, in
M. Spensky (ed.), Universalisme, particularisme et citoyenneté dans les Iles Britanniques, Paris, L’Harmattan 2000, p. 138. 

[38] R. Konstantinović, op. cit.  [39] « Le biologique s’étatise », M. Foucault, “Il faut défendre la société”. Cours au Collège de France. 1976, Gallimard/Seuil 1997, (cours du 17 mars 1976) pp. 213-235. 

[40] From the non-citizenship and refoulement of migrants and refugees, to the differed European citizenship of the inhabitants of new member states, who have the right to travel within Europe, but will not have for some years the right to work elsewhere; except for subleased work organised and state-controlled for whole groups /by the way of Poles, citizens of a new member-state, as much as of Maghrebians!/ of people who have no rights, no benefits whatsoever etc., not to count all those drowned in the Mediterranean in their passage.

     [41] Some, indeed, like L. Wittgenstein  or like all those that, in the West, reach out for Buddhism etc., will look at it for therapeutical remedies. 

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