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Ethnicization and the Nation. A Politics of Philosophy (Chapter 2/6)

Posté par radaivekovicunblogfr le 30 octobre 2009

Apart fromt the separate presentation on this site of the unpublishd book A politics of philosophy,  the latter starts here from its second chapter. The site is under construction and the chapters too. The first chapter of A Politics of Philosophy will not appear here, as it has been shortened and transformed into a paper for the online journal Transeuropéennes,  www.transeuropeennes.eu. That paper is titled « A Politics of Philosophy since Modernity. Indian and Western philosophies ».

 ©rada iveković

 A POLITICS OF PHILOSOPHY  Chapter 2

Ethnicization and nation in the making of larger integrations – (on the Identity principle)[1] 

The turning point of 1989 has shaken Europe and is affecting its construction. In the sense that the end of the Cold War period from that year on has rendered overtly visible and further undeniable the irreversible process of globalization, it is also part and parcel of the general reconfiguration of power, economy and communication on the whole planet. That is furthermore  the point in time from which more than one analogy can be drawn between the post-socialist condition and the post-colonial condition  in the first place, but from which a complementarity and mutual dependence can now clearly be seen between these two processes as well as the deep crisis of the Western Welfare State – of welfare, that is, more than of the state as such. And, more generally, of the state itself in the sense that its functionalities and role are changing. In addition, the linking of state and nation is reinterrogated, as territoriality is bypassed by new tasks taken on by the state, and as the “nation” makes new didentitarian claims. Nevertheless, our imagination is still to a great extent “national” even as it is “international” instead of being transnational.  We have relied until the cold war on three general patterns: the western state (let’s call it “real capitalism” or the “really existing democracy”), the socialist state (“real socialism” or “popular democracies”) and the state in the third world. In all three cases, the “transition” (much more blurred in the case of the “West”), though undefined, is supposed to be that towards an unquestioned western capitalist model, rather neo-liberal (in the European continental sense of the term). Clearly, we will soon need to redefine the unsatisfactory term of “post-colonialism” with regard to this parentage, but also with a view to other historic reasons and to the coloniality of power as such. While the colonial and the socialist/communist Modernity is considered to have been a failure and maybe a side-product of Western Modernity, the latter – which is the starting point of the Western Capitalist pattern – is still proposed as the best and indeed the only one to follow, this time by erasing decades of local history and by starting anew from zero. Thus the end of the Cold War represents a second important breach after that of Modernity. As the latter, it also proposes a discontinuity to non hegemonic cultures, economies, histories, languages, but within it, a shorter term gap that could more easily be bridged. The rupture of the Cold War deals with a historic “delay” imagined to be of a few decades, while that of Modernity dealt with the time span from antiquity till the future (the whole arrow of time) and with a principled unequal footing. The violence in store through this levelling of time and history is rarely foreseen. Through it, the nation produces its minorities, as the state fabricates its regionalisms and sometimes its secessions.[2] The comparative analysis of the cases of violent partitions, such as that of India in the forties or of the former Yugoslavia in the nineties of the 20th century,[3] shows however that the patterns of ethnicization which resulted from both the conflicts cross the lines of a supposed “pre-modernity” to become the features created by completely “modern” and “post-modern” conditions, such as the constitution of Europe for example[4], and are more or less the same This happens in a “post- modern” levelling of the historic conditions whereby similar processes of racism, ethnicisation, regionalism, communalism, diversification, atomisation, religious and other fundamentalism together with secession etc. and supported by economic processes of globalization, represent the flipside of the great integrating processes. What we are facing with the three types of state are really three intertwined failures which usually go under the “triumphal” heading of the western capitalist pattern (sometimes itself described as the natural evolution or extension of the Welfare State): the undeniable breakdown of the socialist state in Eastern Europe, the (near) malfunction of the welfare state in the West, the collapse of the first post-colonial states (non-racial and secular) in the Third World. The three worlds were really one.  There were some similarities in the second and the third world, at least at the level of projects and utopias. These were sometimes called Marxist or Socialist in both camps, but they covered a whole range of different situations resulting from differing historic conditions. Both started as revolutionary in the sense that they represented a radical breach with local capitalism, feudalism or colonialism. For example, they shared some ideals about social equality and justice, about repairing injustice to the downtrodden, about a non-racial and non-nationalistic order (though the practice may have been different). They emphasized social and collective rights (not that these are the same) over political and individual rights (again, not that these are the same). In many cases (especially in the Third World) they didn’t have the means of the first – of collective and social rights, while they neglected the second – political and individual rights – in the name of patriotic homogenization. They failed in achieving their goals so far, and some of them produced new situations of colossal injustice, repressive regimes, totalitarianism etc.  But the similarities of the post-socialist and the post-colonial situation do not lay only in a supposed liberation from conditions of servitude and of domination by one nation over another (as post-communist nationalists of different denomination would have it). Rather, there are some similarities (and this is shared by the West too, though the degrees may vary) inherent to the difficulties and the obstacles in the way of the constitution of autonomous political subjects (agents) and thus of independent and responsible citizenship in the new, post-modern conditions. Not to speak of situations where, with the opening of vast new and unsuspected virtual spaces , of new forms of socialization due to mass migrations and globalization, as well as of generally closing ecological-economic options and failure of representational politics where knowledge and networks are absorbed, through bodies, within both capital and subjectivity, and where new political forms need to be invented. Political subjects are called citizens when it comes to the state, and refer to national state sovereignty and hierarchy, also to governance by a latter figure, through their limited autonomy of which indeed, the confines are not acknowledged. The way these obstacles arise may not be the same in the case of the second and of the third world. Yet, there is a general tendency emphasized today – corroborated by an age-old leaning – to resist alternative and autonomous subject-constitution or to limit it without saying so, and to resent open citizenship (not conditioned by class, ethnic or national, age, gender or other determinations) of those who are not already “in”. The process of gradual democratization will rather allow for the active citizenship of some groups, while trying to maintain outside the political scope others (regardless of the universal intention of the constitution, for example), and, in general, “the masses”. The machine resisting this subject-constitution is on the one hand the community (including the nation), on the other the state. The nation resists fiercely its own evolution towards a society, acting here, in its capacity as a community in the narrow sense, as an ally of the state. The state refuses to accept as much as possible, and through ever new devices, that for which it is at the same time still de facto the only possible framework – a society of transcommunal citizens acting in common and in solidarity through individual and shared responsibility. The first grade of resistance of the state and of the community to the transformation of the tribal or ethnic mentality into a society, is their intervention in the reconfiguration of patriarchy, through the creation of new “traditions”. These relations are the first to be renegotiated so as to represent a preliminary “contract” for any other rapport. Naturally, this happens through a narrative, a dominant political discourse and ideology, and, where deemed necessary, also through laws.[5] We thus see patriarchies renegotiated everywhere, especially in violently modernizing societies, as if the condition of women and their dress were by far the main political issue. Some real social and political advances for women are paid by them through wardrobe compromises and moral-ideological submission. The benefit of such bargains for them is relative and locally defined, incalculable in comparative and absolute terms, or – untranslatable. What interferes in such translation too, is the normative character of “the political”.  In some countries of Eastern Europe and of the former
Yugoslavia, the reconfiguration and redistribution of power and patriarchy after the fall of the socialist regimes, during conflict and in the establishment of new ethnocracies, resulted in a quick consensus passed between former and new elites and stakeholders (who are often the same people). The transition in these countries represents often a serious setback for women, including in the sphere of rights and not only in the standard of living, considering the egalitarian rights previously accorded them in socialism (esp. the rights regarding their body, their formal individual citizenship and work). This is so against the general economic, systemic setback (including the decrease of life-expectancy for men) in those countries, due to wars, extreme pauperization, the growing of mafias and the breakdown of institutions. In such conditions, the standard of living, both individual and collective, has fallen for everyone. But given the traditional role of women as menders of the social link, nurturer, caring for the survival of the family, they have been struck hard if not harder when the traditional mothering role of the socialist state, once addressed to everyone, has crumbled to pieces overnight (social services, education, health etc. are all of a sudden no more free and have to be paid for). This comes in addition to the “retraditionalisation” of values, the loss of equality and access to the public sphere for women, with the militarization, primitivization, “vulgarization” and mafiazation of society, and to women’s massive loss of jobs. Post-socialist transition is not such a big achievement as far as women are concerned, either in Eastern Europe or in China. Their access to the exercise of citizenship is again prevented and diverted over a rhetoric of retrograde “family values”, misogynous speech and boasting with hyper-virile and military features. 
  The European Union is being constructed as a regional trans-national organization of states geographically open towards
Asia and having to reconfigure and redefine its boundaries to the East. Turkey is being constructed as the big obstacle on the part of France and Germany especially. The real question is, who will be included, and who excluded? The divide has been fought over the past 20 years in the Balkans, and it is generally understood that some countries of the Second World (the former Socialist Block) are included (though not all), but so far no Third World country (Cyprus and Malta come nearest to the latter, but the former has been absorbed over Greece directly into the First World – “developed” – and it is by the same token kept partitioned). The construction of
Europe is itself taking place within the very process of globalization which has become visible to the general public and common knowledge since 1989. Globalization is characterized by greater integration processes at one end (such as Europe and general globalization, i.e. the universalization of Western Modernity) and at the same time by disintegration processes at the other end, described as processes of racialization, ethnicisation, regionalism, communalism, diversification, atomization, together with secession and partitions. These are not contradictory but complementary processes. Yet within a state, and within a regional unification project such as Europe, the first aspect (unification) will combat the second aspect of the process in order to be able to carry further, and also in order to preserve in power the ruling elites. The constituted power, however temporary or limited, will resist further drives of the constituting power and will be opposed to it. One could say that unity itself requires bifurcations and requires then to hold and encompass them. Furthermore,
Europe has for a long time been only an economic project of the rich boys’ club. Only through the years of the Yugoslav conflict has Europe been confronted with its responsibility to its outer borders and neighbouring countries, and this only when it perceived this conflict as a threat. Before the fatidic 1989 year, Europe never had a project of gradually including other countries to the East, mainly thought to safely belong to the Socialist block. This inclusion, if not gradual, planned, willed and organized, was going to produce violence and wars, as was seen from the Yugoslav example. Because it had no such concept of a gradual enlargement, but of closing its borders around its own Fortress, Europe was itself not a political subject in international affairs (member countries were so to different degrees) and could not intervene in the Balkan war. There was no European common political will or government. This is where the United States stepped in, much to the displeasure of most European leaders (except those of Great Britain) and of a great part of the European public opinion. This is also where “globalization” comes in, the slow constitution of a political Europe (not yet complete, but more ahead now), being as much part of it as the series of wars in the Balkans. Europe, in its construction, should now think of how to conceptualize its citizenship as transnational: but this doesn’t seem to be an official option. It tries to bar access to immigrants from the South and from the East (its former colonies), while at the same time it needs new skilled labour. The Germans have at least acknowledged the latter by introducing a selection, with quotas and categories of skilled immigrants for
India which puts into question some ethical principles as well as the very concept of European citizenship. This pattern is likely to be followed by others. One after the other, European countries are redefining their borders and visa politics for immigrants from the South and from the East, while there is a general tendency to cooperate in the field of repressive policies barring immigration. This is enhanced by criminalizing foreigners and migrants, depoliticizing and ethnicizing immigrant communities or citizens of foreign descent. In

France, the issue of the supposed “islamist” veil of underage girls in school triggered a wave of claims for human and civic rights from the Republic, as well as by reaction an ethnicizing resistance to those claims by hardcore nationalist circles. “Collateral damage” was suffered by a few Sikh boys in French schools, who had to pay the price of the French type of secularism (for “ostentatious religious signs”) along with the veils girls[6]. The Sikhs were actually completely unknown to the French and were discovered on that occasion.  The concept of missing citizen in analogy with the concept of missing women for India, should be introduced for
Europe, possibly with a gradation for silenced citizens.  Missing citizens – missing to Europe as possible citizens are all those migrants, sometimes on the road to
Europe for years – who never make it. We hear figures about the drowned in the Mediterranean or near the Canary Islands every day, but who will calculate the scandal of the total missing citizenry as a price for European citizenship? That violence of Europe borders has been accepted by public opinion at large, and the numbers are not heeded nor added to give a general idea of the phenomenon. 

The proportions taken within Europe by the discourse on securitatian “citizenship” today, contributing to enforcing a police state and also a police society “by securitarian consensus” in order to control the new poor and the immigrants/refugees, and the “extra-communitarians” in the first place, show well that the inner policy is part of a larger position held also on the external level of foreign policy, configuring a whole in the construction of the European Union. This also goes over regionalisation which has taken a new turn since 1989.[7] Whereas before this date the regions were purely local, the Europe-of-the-regions operates nowadays through the exacerbation of closed ethnic identities. The latter have the tendency to ignore or to carve out differently national borders while favouring ethnic, linguistic and cultural borders and creating a new “tradition”. They divide, ethnicize and sexuate the nation, represent the right to citizenship in ethnic terms, and are closely linked rather to the right side of the political spectrum than to the centre. They do it through reinventing foundation myths. The dismantlement of the former
Yugoslavia was also part of such a process. In the West, this regionalism brings about micro-nationalisms from the bottom, but it serves the purpose of globalization whenever using it (for transborder business, rather than to let migrants move freely in).  The revision of the Welfare State through its ethnicization (social incentives given only to nationals, as was the case in a town held by the Front National for a time in France, or as J. Haider had introduced in his native place in Austria, for example) is on the agenda and increasingly accepts co-existence in the sense of apartheid. It goes as far as invoking multiculturalism in view of a project of federalism of ethnic units, as do some rightist parties and movements in northern
Italy. In the meantime, the populist Berlusconi is still there in Italy though somewhat shaken, allied with xenophobic, anti-immigrant and anti-welfare forces, and it seems as if there too Europe will develop to the best of its worst capacities. While some big cities valiantly resist, the European left in general has not been capable of recomposing itself and unifying for whatever elections. Comparable situations are in preparation elsewhere in Western Europe. 

The type of discourse proposed by these new champions of an ethnocentric,  populist, rightest, anti-immigrant and anti-welfare
Europe should be carefully scrutinized. The ethnicist story, which is also macho and has the primary function of enforcing a clear separation between men and women in order to enforce the general social hierarchy and distance between “us” and “them”, is a closed  narrative. It is an identitarian determinist tale by which the contents of the identity in question are given in advance through an official and only version of a unique and absolute truth (which, however, may come through a regional local leader). There is usually a unique and one-dimensional interpretation of an original event (as if the event were in itself accessible) as that what happened, an arrested story. All the multiple possibilities of the event (what could have happened) are discarded and reduced to one sole interpretation which is also the fixation (the falsification) of the event into a “unique truth”, so that not only the past, but also the future, is univocal and in the hands of the narrator. This type of discourse takes the outcome of a conflict for its causes, and its circularity will not let history open as a matter of choice of all the agents at each moment, but will produce a History as determinism.[8] Also, it manifests an ingenuity (naïveté) regarding the language and its own capacity to escape language’s functioning, as if the idiom’s and the order‘s power mechanisms didn’t apply to it (to the discourse). As if it could pretend to be the exception to the rule within the laws of language-power that produce nomination, domination, exclusion etc., and as if language were not the institution we are born into and which shapes hierarchies. 
The appropriating function of language is the reason why any freedom battle has also to be fought through language and must try and reinvent its propositions; and why any new “identity” has to give itself a narration about its “origin” as well as about its aim. The hope for a democratic solution remains with recognizing one’s debt and origin in alterity. Deriving the origin from a unique source and a unilinear genealogy settles for a determined future by drawing it from an arrested history. On the contrary, opening the past to multiplicity is also a chance for the future of women and men. We should try and get away from history as fatality, even in the difficulties and setbacks recognized in any present situation. 

The case of the Indian subcontinent and of India is good to compare with Europe for their comparable size. It is true that we don’t have any direct  integration process in South Asia, but rather the effects of a prolonged partition. Yet there still is a recognizable regional dynamics as inner matters in one country cross the borders in their implications. In India, nationalism chose to follow the “religious sect model” rather than that of properly social stratifications (imaginary or real), or rather than an approach which, at first glance, would have been clearly identified as political by western – rather narrow – criteria[9]. Thus, for the nationalists, the model of the nation is precisely that of the (religious) community. In
India, the central issue following the struggle for independence lies in the balance of forces between Hindu nationalism and Indian nationalism. The latter was represented at the time of liberation by the secularism of the Congress party, and by Nehru himself. The de-legitimation of this Nehru-inspired, secular model of the state and society started in the 1980s, in spite of the important role played by culture in the preservation of national unity, and this tendency joined up with the nationalist Hindu current, whose origins went back to the middle of the nineteenth century (but also to the quarrel over Ayodhya, which reached its apogee in 1992 when the mosque at that site was destroyed in favour of the temple). Though this was not predestined, and in the absence of any new project, the erosion of Indian secularism had been  hastened, on the one hand, by Indira Gandhi’s repression and, on the other hand, by the political exploitation of religious cleavages, both of which militated against a more substantial form of democracy. And here we might add that this period of discomfiture of the secular project (which was that of the initial decolonisation period) ended up in the globalist framework at the same time that the cold war was ending and “real socialism” was disappearing. At least in Europe, the end of the latter, was spurred on by a similar resistance to democratisation on the part of the various oligarchies which, in both contexts, attempted to preserve their privileges by adopting a nationalist type of discourse. This convergence appears to us to be significant, and not at all fortuitous: it would seem to be a global process[10]. The failure of secular politics is nowadays generalized through a generalized balkanization.
 



In Eastern Europe and in the West, nationalism has been discredited by Nazism, and also recently by the explosion of various belligerent nationalisms, such as in the former Yugoslavia. But since the struggle for independence, in India as in other formerly-colonised countries, nationalism has been a positive, liberating concept: it is the one that was destined to bring about the interlocking independence of the nation and the state, the nation being at the service of the state more often than the opposite. Nationalism, as an emancipating force whose spirit of resistance was forged during the long colonial period, is ambiguous about the differences between the sexes, which it uses nevertheless in establishing its hierarchies of nations. And it is important to be clear about this, because the hierarchy of the sexes tends to present itself as archetypal, in the sense that it underlies and determines all the other hierarchies in its role of supervising “racial purity”. The control of sexuality is a very persuasive means of coercion in any framework whatever, and it takes precedence over the state[11]. It is the colony that brings to fruition and sets up the state which is later to become independent. The colony brings about an ambiguous, displaced form of modernity that is supposed to be applied to “pre-modern” conditions. It thus produces results that are politically, socially and culturally different from those to be found in the West. The colonisers are members of societies which like to think of themselves as democratic and universalist (but which do not apply these principles in the territories they occupy)[12]. All of this has the effect of expelling the subject from his/her traditional community, thus inducing the latter to attempt a reformulation of social ties (which is always based on a reconstitution and adjustment of the patriarchate). This can take place either through a more or less conservative or obscurantist “re-traditionalisation” (re-communalisation), or through an attempt on the part of the subject to make a “free” choice within the society (a more modern, conflict-ridden choice, and possibly, at most, the outline of a modern patriarchal society). Communalist modes of distribution of power can very well co-exist with a statist – or even a modern – mode of organisation of power, so that the two do not take place on the same level, but rather intersect[13]. With the state, however, there is also the separation of private and public power, although this pattern does not correspond to forms of organization of labour and social interdependencies. And it is here that one gets a direct glimpse of the fact that “power is naked”, and that “the universal is empty”. Henceforth, the father is only the head of the family, wielding more or less arbitrary individual power in the home, whereas for the colonial state he may be the enemy, the subaltern, the dissident, etc. Colonialism weakens this “local” father. And so the father, who in principle is a figure of domination, takes revenge on his dependents; for example, he can re-establish the hierarchy by attaching his personal power to that of a resistance movement, which thereby becomes an accomplice of oppression by the family, the caste and the community. Liberation on one front does not automatically mean liberation on another front, and, according to the circumstances, it can take on ever-new configurations. J. Habermas seems to be unaware of the ambivalence of this conditional, transplanted modernity (which is nonetheless often  a resourceful force for liberation, however incompletely, in non-European contexts) when, buoyed up with optimism, he talks about the social reconfiguration that takes place “with each advance”: “With each new advance in modernisation, intersubjectively-experienced worlds open up, reorganise themselves and close down again. This change in form is at the heart of classical sociology, which gives ever-new descriptions of the phenomenon: from status to contract, from the primary group to the secondary group, from community to society, from mechanical solidarity to organic solidarity, etc. The impulse to open up comes from new markets, new resources, new lines of communication.”[14]  “Identity”, though nothing precise or lasting in itself, is a construct which, once fixed, helps homogenize around and defend some power. Some identities (gender, ethnic etc.) may be used in the construction of other identities (nation, state). Identity is claimed, group solidarity played-out and the identity principle maintained only where power is at stake and in the function of power. 
Rather than build his identity through a process of differentiation and individuation that relies on exchange and interaction, on individuation and on becoming a subject and a citizen, the aggressive type (the Hindu nationalist, the Serbian or Croatian nationalist) seeks immediate exclusion – violence and war. He can, paradoxically, try to compensate the sense of insufficiency only by increasing the doses of death and violence. Time offers all the possibilities, that of violence, and that of not: but all its virtual possibilities never occur, never become reality. By confiscating time, the time of life itself (by killing, waging war etc), the violent never allow for a bifurcation in history, for the other virtualities to be concretized. They leave us only with a « continuity » of visible occurrences which fabricate time as unilinear and determined if not determinist, and violence as seemingly unavoidable. This gives them a mastery over time spans, over the lives of others, power to control occurrences and history, the power of violence which is « grace » and the status of exception attributed to oneself as a perpetrator of crimes enjoying self-attributed impunity. As the philosopher Radomir Konstantinović says, « the lesser the sentiment of reality, the greater the necessity for violence ».[15] Resorting to security in groups and relying on violence is a clear sign of seeking a lost totality, and the sign of a loss of the « universal ». It is also the loss of the thread of continuity in/of the same. Violence may itself be the sheer attempt to overcome the frightening paradoxical situation and fact by which we are born of the other and not of ourselves. It may be the mere quest for the identity principle, un-interrupted.[16] The first violence is already birth, the separation necessary for the individuation to come. And Europe is resorting to such “group security” in its Schengen zone, in the closure of its borders, in the various buffer zones on its borders where candidate countries to access are asked to make the selection and play the European policemen in anticipation of their future inmate status. This simple and spreading European mechanism is a pre-emptive attempt to “be bore(e) within”. It saves from inner violence but exports the latter to the outer brink. 


[1] An early version of the present paper was presented at the Second South Asian Human Rights and Peace Studies Orientation Course organized by the South Asia Forum for Human Rights in Kathmandu 1-15 September 2001. It draws on my article “From the nation to partition, through partition to the nation”, Ghislaine Glasson Deschaumes &
R. Ivekovic (eds.), Divided Countries, Separated Cities. The Modern Legacy of Partition,
Delhi, OUP 2003, pp. 150-175
, as well on my own contribution to the joint introduction  to From Gender to Nation, ed. by de R. Iveković & J. Mostov, Europe and the Balkans Institute, Longo Editore, Ravenna 2002; reprint by Kali for Women Zubaan, Delhi 2004. 
[2]
R. Samaddar, The Marginal Nation. Transborder Migration from Bangladesh to West Bengal, Sage Publications,
New Delhi/Thousand Oaks/London 1999. For a concrete example:
R. Samaddar, “Nagaland’s past in the crystal ball”, in: The Telegraph, 17-11-1999. Also :  States, Citizens and Outsiders. The Uprooted People of South Asia, ed. by Tapan K. Bose & Rita Manchanda, SAFHR, Kathmandu 1997. 
[3] See Divided Countries, Separated Cities, op. cit. on partitions, and La Mazarine  N° 15, Winter 2001, “Le post-colonialisme: d’une revolution à une autre”. [4] Ivan Iveković, A Political Economy of Contemporary Ethno-national Mobilization. Ethnic and Regional Conflicts in Yugoslavia and Transcaucasia, Longo Editore, Ravenna, 2000; Miloš Minić, Dogovori u Karadjordjevu o podeli Bosne i Hercegovine, Rabić,
Sarajevo 1998;  M. Minić, Ratovi na Kosovu (1998/1999) i u Čečniji (1994/1996), Rabić, Sarajevo 2000. See
Etienne Balibar, Nous, citoyens d’Europe?
Les frontières, l’Etat, le peuple, la découverte, 2001. 
[5] Though the consensus, regarding women in particular is sometimes so strong that it requires no law. Also, a law may contradict the universality of a constitution in the name of the more widely recognized universality of the subordination of women, as is the case in Algeria (but in other places too, though here it is blunt), where the Family Law (Code de la famille) of 1983 is in total contradiction with the Constitution according equal rights to all citizens. [6] Rada Iveković, “The Veil in France: Secularism, Nation, Women” in Economic and Political Weekly, Bombay, March  13, 2004. [7] Bruno Luverà, “Europa delle regioni – tra collaborazione transfrontaliera e nuovi nazionalismi di confine”, intervention at the conference “Sconfinare. Differenze di genere e di culture nell’Europa di oggi”, Universtity of Urbino,  9-10 November, 2000, in Sconfinare,
Laura Piccioni (a cura di), Edizioni Goliardiche, Urbino 2002
. The ideas until the end of the paragraph come from there. By the same author: I confini dell’odio. Il nazionalismo etnico e la nuova destra europea, Editori Riuniti, Roma 1999, and: Il Dottor H. Haider e la nuova destra europea, Einaudi, Torino 2000.See also the excellent
Paolo Rumiz, La secessione legera. Dove nasce la rabbia del profondo Nord, Editori Riuniti, Roma 1998; and, R. Iveković, La balcanizzazione della ragione, manifestolibri, Roma 1995. 
[8]
R. Samaddar , “Birth of a Nation”, in
R. Samaddar (ed.), Reflexions on the Partition in the East, Vikas,
Delhi 1997. 
[9] Ch. Jaffrelot, Les Nationalistes hindous. Idéologie, implantation et mobilisation des années 1920 aux années 1990 (Paris: Presse de
la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1993), pp. 43, 58. 

[10] This in no way justifies an identification between the first phase of decolonisation of third-world countries and the second phase in Eastern Europe (after the fall of the Berlin wall), seen as a “decolonisation from socialism”, contrary to what nationalists and ethnocrats from  this region have claimed. 

[11]  Partha Chatterjee, “More on Modes of Power and the Peasantry”, in R. Guha and
G. Chakravorty Spivak (eds.), Selected Subaltern Studies (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 363.
 

[12] Maurice Goldring, “Irlande, droits collectifs et droits individuels”, in
M. Spensky (ed.), Universalisme, particularisme et citoyenneté dans les Iles Britanniques ( Paris : L’Harmattan, 2000), p. 112. 

[13]  Partha Chatterjee, “More on Modes of Power and the Peasantry”, in R. Guha and
G. Chakravorty Spivak (eds.), Selected Subaltern Studies, op. cit., pp. 351-390.
 

[14] Jürgen Habermas, Die postnationale Konstellation. Politische Essays, Frankfurt a/M.: Suhrkamp 1998; quoted in the French translation  Après l’Etat-nation, Paris: Fayard 2000, pp. 80-81. 

[15] R. Konstantinović, Filozofija palanke,
Beograd, Nolit 1981 (first ed. 1969), p. 67. 

[16] R. Iveković, “Borders, Partitions and Disappearances (India, Yugoslavia, Guatemala)”, manuscript, and “Disparitions, mémoire, oubli: La violence au Guatemala”, in A. Brossat, J.-L. Déotte (eds.), L’époque de la disparition. Politique et esthétique, L’Harmattan, paris 2000, pp. 155-175.

 

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